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The Supreme Court has held that life without parole is an unconstitutional
sentence for nearly all juvenile defendants—except for a select few that the criminal
justice system deems irredeemable. Though this represents a positive development
in the Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, it has left the case law deeply unsettled. For instance, the Court has held that redeemable juveniles are all entitled to
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” but it has failed to explicitly define
what that constitutional mandate means in practice. On top of that, the Court has
concluded that not even expert psychologists can determine at sentencing whether a
juvenile is irredeemable. However, lower courts may still sentence certain juvenile
homicide defendants to life without parole if they can somehow make that
determination.
This Comment addresses questions left unanswered in the wake of the Court’s
recent juvenile sentencing cases. Because the Court has held that conclusively determining whether a juvenile defendant is irredeemable at sentencing is a fraught endeavor, and that a meaningful opportunity to obtain release means more than
simply a release immediately before a defendant’s specific life expectancy, this Comment argues that the Eighth Amendment provides a constitutional right to a timely
parole hearing with the presumption of release for all juvenile defendants. The ultimate focus of this Comment is to address the question that instituting a constitutional right to a parole hearing for juvenile defendants will inevitably pose: When
must that parole hearing occur? Drawing on state legislative enactments, available
parole data, and the Court’s analysis in its prior decisions, this Comment argues
that juvenile defendants have a constitutional right to a parole hearing before the
twenty-sixth year of their respective sentences.
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INTRODUCTION
After his parents kicked him out at the age of sixteen and
forced him to live in a shack, Brian Bassett committed a heinous
crime: he murdered his mother, father, and brother. Facing mandatory life in prison for each count of aggravated first degree murder, Bassett was convicted and sentenced to three consecutive life
terms without the possibility of parole.1 After the Supreme Court
abolished mandatory life sentences for juveniles in Miller v
Alabama,2 the Washington State Legislature gave Bassett a new
chance at life by requiring courts to consider a juvenile’s diminished culpability during sentencing for aggravated first degree
murder convictions.3 At Bassett’s appeal, his pediatric psychologist testified that Bassett suffered from an adjustment disorder,
and Bassett himself testified that at the time of his crimes he was
unable to understand the consequences of his actions.4 The now
thirty-five-year-old Bassett had also turned his life around in
prison: he had no infractions in sixteen years, earned his GED
and a spot on his community college’s honor roll, and mentored
other inmates.5 The sentencing judge—despite the state’s failure
to present evidence rebutting Bassett’s arguments—rejected
Bassett’s evidence and denied his appeal.6 It was not until the
Washington Supreme Court took his case and held that imposing
life without parole on juvenile defendants is unconstitutional that
Bassett finally secured an opportunity to escape the mistakes he
made as a juvenile.7
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision follows the United
States Supreme Court’s steps over the past decade to establish
new categorical rules,8 which flow from the Eighth Amendment

1

See State v Bassett, 428 P3d 343, 346 (Wash 2018).
567 US 460, 479 (2012) (“We therefore hold that the Eight Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders.”).
3
See Wash Rev Code § 10.95.030.
4
Bassett, 428 P3d at 346–47.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id at 360. Though ruling under its own state constitution, the Washington Supreme Court employed the same categorical analysis the Supreme Court uses in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See note 8 and Part I.A for further discussion.
8
This Comment often refers to “categorical rules” and “the categorical analysis.” In
the Eighth Amendment context, the categorical analysis refers to whether a sentencing
practice violates the Eighth Amendment. If the Court finds that a practice does, it will
establish a categorical rule barring that sentencing practice. The categorical approach is
distinct from the case-by-case approach, in which a defendant challenges her sentence’s
2
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and have radically transformed the landscape of juvenile sentencing. The Court first abolished the death penalty for juveniles in
Roper v Simmons,9 then life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders in Graham v
Florida,10 followed by mandatory LWOP11 for juvenile homicide
offenders in Miller. In Montgomery v Louisiana,12 the Court retroactively extended Miller and Graham’s reach.13
In its post-Roper jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized
two common points. First, “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”14 Second, so long as juvenile defendants are not among the rare group who are deemed
irredeemable,15 they deserve a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release.”16 These doctrinal changes presented juvenile defendants
like Bassett with a real chance to reintegrate into society.
Despite the Court’s recent penchant for mitigating life sentences for juveniles, several unanswered questions remain in the
wake of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. For instance, what did
the Court mean when it held that all redeemable juveniles are
entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”?17 Does
that mandate extend to a term-of-years sentence, or consecutive
term-of-years sentences, that lasts for the duration of a juvenile

constitutionality as applied to the specific facts of her case. For a further discussion of both
of these approaches to Eighth Amendment challenges, see Part I.A.
9
543 US 551 (2005).
10 560 US 48 (2010).
11 This Comment uses the terms “mandatory,” “de facto,” and “discretionary” to characterize LWOP sentences. Mandatory LWOP is a statutory requirement that sentencing
courts automatically impose LWOP for certain offenses without hearing the defendant’s
mitigating qualities or circumstances. Discretionary LWOP describes when a sentencing
court makes its own determination, based on the characteristics of the defendant and the
nature of the offense, that LWOP is the appropriate punishment. De facto LWOP constitutes consecutive term-of-years sentences that last for the duration of a juvenile homicide
offender’s life expectancy. This Comment considers de facto LWOP to be a sentence lasting
fifty or more years in prison, pursuant to the Sentencing Project’s estimate. See Ashley
Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences *17 (The
Sentencing Project, May 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/3CDV-D8SJ.
12 136 S Ct 718 (2016).
13 Id at 729.
14 Miller, 567 US at 471 (discussing Roper and Graham).
15 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 734. The Court actually uses the term “incorrigible” to
describe juvenile defendants that can be assessed LWOP, but this Comment uses “irredeemable” because juvenile corrigibility is also used in the context of juvenile disobedience
and immaturity.
16 Graham, 560 US at 75.
17 Id.
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homicide offender’s life expectancy (de facto LWOP)? Does it apply to nonmandatory life sentences for homicide offenders? These
questions are salient for many convicted juveniles. As of 2016,
2,310 individuals were serving LWOP for crimes committed as juveniles, and an additional 2,089 individuals who were convicted
of crimes committed as juveniles were serving sentences that
amounted to de facto LWOP.18 But if all juveniles, save those who
are deemed irredeemable, ought to be afforded an opportunity for
release, how do we determine when that opportunity arises?
A more specific question follows this inquiry: Under the
Eighth Amendment, what is the maximum number of years to
which a redeemable juvenile defendant may constitutionally be
sentenced before being constitutionally entitled to a parole hearing?19 Answering this question will not only aid juveniles already
sentenced to LWOP and de facto LWOP, but also help the 7,346
juveniles sentenced to life with parole (LWP).20 The answer would
also equip sentencing courts with a bright-line rule.
The two federal circuit courts that have grappled with this
question—the Third and Eleventh—have failed to provide a clear
solution because they have focused on the narrow question of a
juvenile defendant’s life expectancy. To determine whether a defendant has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the use of a generic, nonindividualized life
expectancy calculation in United States v Mathurin,21 holding
that a defendant could still reduce his total sentence through
good-time credit.22 Meanwhile, in United States v Grant,23 the
Third Circuit held that sentencing courts should determine a
juvenile offender’s life expectancy through an individualized sentencing calculation, based on factors like medical records and
family medical history, and consider the age of retirement as an

18 See Nellis, Still Life at *17 (cited in note 11). It is worth noting that the United
States is the only country in the world that imposes life sentences on its youth. See Katie
Rose Quandt, Why Does the U.S. Sentence Children to Life in Prison? (JSTOR Daily, Jan
31, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/6G7Y-4LRS.
19 This Comment often refers to this question as “the ‘when’ question.”
20 Nellis, Still Life at *17 (cited in note 11).
21 868 F3d 921 (11th Cir 2017).
22 Id at 933–34. For a lengthier discussion of Mathurin, see Part III.A.
23 887 F3d 131 (3d Cir 2018), vacd en banc, 905 F3d 285 (3d Cir 2018). Though the
en banc hearing has been completed and an opinion has yet to be issued, Grant’s basic
precepts are worth discussing for the purposes of creating a parole-eligibility age for juveniles. For a lengthier discussion of Grant, see Part III.A.
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independent sentencing factor when sentencing juvenile defendants.24 Both courts sidestepped the use of actuarial tables, which
forecast an individual’s life expectancy based on distinguishing
factors such as race, income, and geography because such tables
might prove constitutionally suspect.25
But the proper method to avoid the constitutional and ethical
issues with using actuarial tables is not to disregard a particular
individual’s life expectancy. Otherwise, a juvenile defendant with
a shorter than average life expectancy would not be guaranteed a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release. And though the retirement age, as a sentencing factor, offers some respite for juvenile
defendants, it does not ensure that redeemable juveniles will
have a parole hearing. The solution lies instead in creating a new
categorical rule: a constitutional right to a parole hearing for all
juvenile defendants. Parole hearings would help determine
whether a juvenile defendant has been sufficiently rehabilitated
from her past misdeeds, or whether her years in prison have
shown her to be irredeemable. Even for those juvenile defendants
determined to be irredeemable at sentencing under Miller, an ex
post parole hearing will ensure that ex ante determination of irredeemability was correct.26
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I examines Supreme Court precedent regarding juvenile sentencing, investigating the evolution from Graham to Miller to Montgomery and the
approach that the Court takes in each case. Part II then analyzes
the three primary questions left unanswered in the wake of these
cases: Does the Eighth Amendment proscribe de facto LWOP?
Does it also proscribe discretionary LWOP? And if both of those
questions are answered in the affirmative, what does the Court
really mean by giving all juvenile defendants a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”? Looking to contemporary
scholarship and state supreme court decisions, this Part shows

24 Grant, 887 F3d at 150 (noting that “society accepts the age of retirement as a
transitional life stage” and “retirement is widely acknowledged as an earned inflection
point in one’s life”) (emphasis omitted).
25 Id at 151 (noting that employing actuarial tables could result in differential sentencing based on race, gender, socioeconomic status, or a host of other factors that influence actuarial life expectancy, but ought not impact sentencing decisions).
26 Miller requires courts to determine whether a juvenile is irredeemable at sentencing (which this Comment describes as “ex ante”). However, this Comment argues that the
only way to be certain that a juvenile is in fact irredeemable is to conduct an assessment
at a parole hearing when that offender becomes an adult (which this Comment refers to
as “ex post”). See Part II.B for further discussion.
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why discretionary and de facto LWOP sentences for redeemable
juveniles are both unconstitutional, and that a meaningful opportunity to obtain release entails a constitutional right to a parole
hearing for a given juvenile defendant significantly before a given
defendant’s life expectancy. Part III then shifts to this Comment’s
principal inquiry: After what number of years of incarceration are
juvenile defendants constitutionally guaranteed a parole hearing? This Part first examines the Third and Eleventh Circuits’
approaches but ultimately concludes that both courts fail to provide a needed bright-line solution. Finally, Part IV provides an
answer to that question by utilizing the Eighth Amendment categorical analysis. Under this framework, this Comment explains
why juvenile defendants have a constitutional right to a parole
hearing before having served twenty-six years of their respective
sentences.
I. THE “TRILOGY” AND BEYOND: GRAHAM, MILLER,
MONTGOMERY, AND THE QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN
Because the categorical approach has formed the basis for the
Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence since Roper, Part I.A
begins with a discussion of the Eighth Amendment and the categorical approach to evaluating Eighth Amendment challenges.
Parts I.B, I.C, and I.D then shift to summarizing the Court’s decisions in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, respectively.
Part I.E synthesizes important takeaways from the Graham line
of cases and illustrates how Miller’s constitutional rule ultimately
belies one of Graham’s key holdings.
A. Eighth Amendment Overview: The Categorical Analysis
The Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence flows
from the Eighth Amendment. Applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,27 the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
government from imposing excessive punishments on individuals.28 The core aim of the Eighth Amendment is to preserve the
dignity of humankind; the state can punish only “within the limits of civilized standards.”29 In its analysis, the Court looks to the

27

See Robinson v California, 370 US 660, 675 (1962).
US Const Amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). See also Atkins v Virginia, 536
US 304, 311 (2002).
29 Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 100 (1958) (Warren) (plurality).
28
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Eighth Amendment’s “text, by considering history, tradition, and
precedent, [ ] with due regard for its purpose and function in the
constitutional design.”30 But the Court’s jurisprudence is not
rooted in eighteenth-century beliefs about punishment.31 The
Court has acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment analysis
must be “flexible and dynamic.”32 As a result, it appraises whether
the sentence violates “the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”33
A defendant can bring one of two separate challenges under
this framework: (1) a case-by-case challenge, arguing her specific
sentence is grossly disproportionate to her crime, or (2) a categorical challenge to the punishment itself. For instance, if Bassett
were challenging his LWOP sentence as cruel and unusual based
on circumstances unique to his case (his difficult upbringing,
mental health issues, etc.), he would be making a challenge under
the case-by-case approach. However, if Bassett were claiming
that LWOP is always unconstitutional, meaning that no juvenile
defendant under any set of facts could receive LWOP, he would
be making a categorical challenge to LWOP. Because the Court’s
jurisprudence has largely centered around the latter approach
with respect to juvenile sentencing issues since Graham,34 this
Comment largely focuses on the categorical analysis.
The Court has crafted categorical rules in two types of cases:
those focusing on the characteristics of the punishment and those
that turn on the characteristics of the offender and the offense.35
Although the Court does not have a test to decide which approach
to follow, recent cases suggest that the categorical approach is

30

Roper, 543 US at 560.
For an originalist perspective of the Eighth Amendment, see generally Justice
Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957, 961–96 (1991) (upholding
an LWOP sentence for a cocaine possession charge after concluding that the Eighth
Amendment does not have a strict proportionality guarantee). But as Part I illustrates,
the Court has transitioned away from this much stricter interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment in cases like Roper and Graham. See Graham, 560 US at 85 (Stevens concurring) (“Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.
Punishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one time may, in the light of reason
and experience, be found cruel and unusual at a later time.”). See also id (noting that a
strict originalist view of the Eighth Amendment might “not rule out a death sentence for
a $50 theft by a 7-year-old”).
32 Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 171 (1976).
33 Trop, 356 US at 101.
34 See Michi Momose, Note, A Case for Hope: Examining Graham v Florida and Its Implications for Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 33 U Hawaii L Rev 391, 394–96 (2010).
35 Graham, 560 US at 59–61.
31

2019]

Categorically Redeeming Graham and Miller

1447

preferable when courts cannot accurately separate defendants deserving the punishment from those who do not.36
When crafting a categorical rule, the Court orients its analysis around two considerations. First, in an effort to estimate national consensus, the Court considers “objective indicia of society’s
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.”37 In considering objective indicia, the Court often looks to
both state statutory schemes and the sentencing practices of state
judges and juries.38 National consensus does not require that a
majority of states oppose a specific practice because “[i]t is not so
much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”39 Second, the Court shifts to
exercising its own judgment about whether the practice violates
the Eighth Amendment, allowing it to consider factors such as the
Eighth Amendment’s text, history and purpose, precedent, social
science research, and the penological goals of the punishment.40
B. Graham v Florida: A Powerful Change of Course
Representing the first instance in which the Court applied
the categorical approach to a non–death penalty case,41 Graham
transformed the discourse surrounding juvenile sentencing.

36
37
38

See id at 77–79.
Roper, 543 US at 563.
Id at 552. The Court observed:

As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the
juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even
where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition
of the practice—provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles . . . as “categorically less culpable.”
Id at 567, quoting Atkins, 536 US at 316.
39 Atkins, 536 US at 315. See also id at 316 (discussing how it is not dispositive for
the objective indicia analysis that state legislatures have not explicitly outlawed a sentencing practice).
40 See Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407, 421 (2008); Roper, 543 US at 564.
41 Graham, 560 US at 69–70 (noting that although death sentences are unique,
LWOP also “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable”). Up until Graham,
the Court had only employed the categorical analysis for death penalty cases. See id at
102 (Thomas dissenting) (“For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire
class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach.”).
See also id at 103 (Thomas dissenting) (“‘Death is different’ no longer.”).
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Although Roper had already distinguished juvenile and adult defendants in its rationale,42 Graham extended Roper’s principles in
abrogating LWOP for juveniles convicted for nonhomicide offenses.43 The Court held that such juveniles were entitled to “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”44 The Court believed that the caseby-case approach was inadequate because it would run the strong
risk that courts could nonetheless incarcerate redeemable
juveniles for life.45
Adhering to its categorical analysis, the Court determined
that both considerations of the rule were satisfied. First, the
Court established that a national consensus existed against sentencing juvenile nonhomicide defendants to LWOP under the objective indicia analysis. The Court determined that only 109 juvenile offenders nationally were serving life sentences for juvenile
nonhomicide LWOP even though 39 jurisdictions at that time allowed for LWOP in such cases.46
Next, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide defendants. Citing the
same type of sociological and psychological studies on which it relied in Roper, the Court held the following: “[J]uveniles have a
‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’;
they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’”47 According to the Court, “It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects . . . transient immaturity,
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable

42 See Roper, 543 US at 569–73 (holding that the death penalty, a truly irrevocable
punishment, is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles because of their mitigating qualities: their lack of maturity, vulnerability to negative influences, and lack of complete
character formation).
43 Graham, 560 US at 69–72, 82 (holding that “the Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide”).
44 Id at 75 (emphasis added).
45 Id at 49. This was the same type of logic that Roper employed when it abolished
the death penalty for juvenile defendants. Roper, 543 US at 572–73 (“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”). Indeed,
Graham built on the distinctions that Roper created between juveniles and adults in ending LWOP for nonhomicide defendants.
46 Graham, 560 US at 62.
47 Id at 68 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Roper, 543 US at 569–70.
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corruption.”48 Because “[irredeemability] is inconsistent with
youth,”49 the Court held that determining that a juvenile defendant is irredeemable at the outset without giving him “a chance to
demonstrate growth and maturity” renders that judgment, at
best, questionable because “it does not follow that he would be a
risk to society for the rest of his life.”50 For the Court, this preemptive assessment of irredeemability “made at the outset” is what
rendered the sentence disproportionate, “[e]ven if the State’s
judgment that Graham was [irredeemable] were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature.”51 Because
expert psychologists believed that juvenile defendants have the
capability of “demonstrat[ing] growth and maturity,” an ex ante
LWOP sentence unconstitutionally deprived Graham of the opportunity to redeem himself.52 This reasoning reflects the Court’s
stance that an ex ante assessment of a juvenile defendant is insufficient. It is only through an ex post redeemability assessment,
years after sentencing, that courts can conclusively deem a
defendant irredeemable.
Finally, the Court looked to the penological justifications underpinning nonhomicide juvenile LWOP, noting that neither retributive nor utilitarian principles serve as sufficient justifications for such sentences. For the former, it deduced that LWOP is
not a proportional punishment for a less culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.53 With regard to utilitarian justifications, it
concluded that because juveniles are not sufficiently mature to
fully appreciate the consequences of their actions, LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders would not actually deter future
crime.54
Although Graham does not explicitly define what it means by
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s opinion for the majority points to a strong reading of
the mandate. For instance, the Court observed that LWOP
“means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store
48

Graham, 560 US at 73, quoting Roper, 543 US at 573.
Graham, 560 US at 73, quoting Workman v Commonwealth, 429 SW 2d 374, 378
(Ky App 1968).
50 Graham, 560 US at 73.
51 Id.
52 Id (“Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth
Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”).
53 Id at 71–72.
54 See Graham, 560 US at 72.
49
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for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison
for the rest of his days.”55 Holding LWOP was effectively tantamount to the death penalty, the Graham Court also reasoned that
LWOP “gives [juvenile nonhomicide defendants] no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”56 In the Court’s eyes, a categorical ban on LWOP
for nonhomicide juvenile defendants afforded juveniles “the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human worth and potential.”57 If Graham were solely limited to
affording juvenile homicide defendants merely an opportunity to
live outside of prison, the Court’s additional language about allowing those defendants opportunities to reconcile with society
would effectively be rendered meaningless. Thus, “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” contextualized with the rest of the
Court’s opinion, must mean more than just a release at some
point before death.58
C. Miller v Alabama: Graham’s Extension to Homicide
Offenders
Graham may have transformed the Court’s jurisprudence
with respect to juvenile sentencing, but Miller signaled that the
Court was not stopping with nonhomicide offenders. In Miller, the
Court held that the Eight Amendment barred mandatory sentences of life without parole for any juvenile defendant59 because
such sentences prevent a sentencing court from considering a juvenile’s “mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest
possible penalty.”60 Chief Justice John Roberts, in dissent, harangued the majority for further extending Graham’s framework,
contending that the majority was “bootstrap[ping] its way to declaring that the Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits” the imposition of juvenile LWOP because “[t]his process has no discernible end point.”61

55 Id at 70 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted), citing Naovarath v State,
779 P2d 944, 945 (Nev 1989).
56 Graham, 560 US at 79.
57 Id.
58 See Part II.C for a further discussion of the Graham mandate.
59 Miller, 567 US at 489.
60 Id.
61 Id at 501 (Roberts dissenting).
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The Miller Court extended Graham’s analysis to the context
of mandatory LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide. Observing that “none of what [Graham] said about children . . . is crimespecific,”62 the Court reasserted two Graham principles:
(1) LWOP is almost akin to the death penalty in its irrevocable
nature;63 and (2) juveniles are “constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing . . . [b]ecause [they] have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”64 In support
of the latter point, the Court again remarked that juveniles’ incomplete physiological and psychological development made
them less likely to be irredeemable.65
With these two conclusions in hand, the Court held that mandatory LWOP for homicide offenses is unconstitutional because it
prevents sentencing judges from considering the “mitigating
qualities of youth.” 66 The Court identified the following factors for
courts to consider (Miller factors): the juvenile defendant’s
(1) “immaturity, impetuousity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences,” (2) family and home environment, (3) relative culpability and the relative effect of familial/peer pressures, (4) challenges in dealing with police officers and counsel as a juvenile,
and (5) “possibility of rehabilitation.”67 Though the Court only
ruled on mandatory penalty schemes and did not foreclose LWOP
sentences for juvenile homicide defendants entirely, it nonetheless noted that such sentences will necessarily be infrequent
given juveniles’ diminished culpability and the difficulty in determining if juveniles ought to be deemed irredeemable at
sentencing.68
D. Montgomery v Louisiana: Not Just a Retroactive Extension
of Miller
The Court’s most recent ruling along its Graham line of cases,
Montgomery, addressed the open issue of whether states must apply Miller retroactively. The Court held that Miller created a new
substantive constitutional rule, and it therefore applied to every
case in which a juvenile received a mandatory LWOP sentence—

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id at 473 (Kagan).
Miller, 567 US at 470.
Id at 471.
Id at 471–72.
Id at 476, quoting Johnson v Texas, 509 US 350, 367 (1993).
Miller, 567 US at 477–78.
Id at 479.
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including those that occurred prior to Miller.69 Because it determined that Miller recognized juveniles were fundamentally different from adults for sentencing purposes, the Court in
Montgomery established that Miller created a substantive constitutional rule.70 As a result, courts must afford a juvenile defendant the opportunity to show her “crime did not reflect
irreparable corruption.”71
But Montgomery did more than retroactively extend Miller—
it also strongly reemphasized the proposition that LWOP should
only be imposed on the rarest of juvenile defendants. First, it concluded that mere consideration of a juvenile’s mitigating qualities
is insufficient.72 A court must instead make a robust determination that the juvenile defendant’s crime “reflects irreparable corruption” if it is to impose an LWOP sentence.73 Second, it emphasized that discretionary LWOP cannot be imposed on the “vast
majority of juvenile offenders.”74 The Court did not mince words
on either of these points. As Alice Reichman Hoesterey points out,
Montgomery emphasizes eight times that juveniles receiving discretionary LWOP must be irreparably corrupt and six times that
such sentences ought to be exceedingly rare.75 Markedly, despite
Montgomery’s strong language and his own vociferous dissent in
Miller, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion in
Montgomery.
E. The Tensions That Emerge from Graham and Its Progeny
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery collectively establish three
key principles. First, all juvenile nonhomicide defendants
(Graham defendants) and the vast majority of juvenile homicide
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Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 734.
Id.
71 Id at 736. Though the Court did not explicate exactly how a juvenile defendant
would prove her redeemability, Montgomery suggests that she could both highlight her
“troubled, misguided youth” and show how she has spent her time in prison demonstrating
reform. Id.
72 Id at 734. “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her [to
LWOP], that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’” Id, quoting Miller, 567 US at 479.
73 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 734, quoting Miller, 567 US at 479.
74 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 734 (“Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but
the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent [irredeemability].”).
75 Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the
Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life without Parole for
Juveniles Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 Fordham Urban L J 149, 173 n 189, 175
n 201 (2017) (collecting sources).
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defendants (Miller defendants) are constitutionally entitled to
meaningful opportunities for release. Second, conclusively determining that a juvenile defendant is irredeemable ex ante is constitutionally suspect because, considering that even expert psychologists cannot rise to the task, such defendants minimally
deserve a chance to show capacity for reform. Third, a court sentencing a Miller defendant must make a robust determination at
sentencing that the defendant is irredeemable to impose LWOP.
Although these principles appear to work together, this Comment argues that Miller’s constitutional rule and Graham’s underlying analysis are in conflict. Graham categorically abrogated
juvenile nonhomicide LWOP partially because the Court believed
that, if even expert psychologists could not separate redeemable
and irredeemable juvenile defendants at sentencing, sentencing
courts could not make that determination with any more certainty. In its amicus curiae brief in support of Miller, the American Psychological Association reaffirmed its belief in the Court’s
pronouncement:
To be sure, research has identified certain childhood risk factors, or “predictors,” that show a statistically significant association with adult criminality. But such studies do not suggest that anyone could reliably determine, ex ante, whether
particular juvenile offenders will reoffend. To the contrary,
the same research makes clear that such predictions cannot
be made with any accuracy. Simply put, while many criminals may share certain childhood traits, the great majority of
juvenile offenders with those traits will not be criminal
adults.76
But Miller nonetheless allowed a sentencing court the option
of sentencing a Miller defendant to LWOP if the court could, after
carefully reviewing the defendant’s mitigating qualities, determine that she is irredeemable. Thus, when imposing discretionary LWOP on a Miller defendant and deeming her irredeemable,
a sentencing court is merely making its best guess about her capacity for reform. Because sentencing courts cannot conclusively
deem a Miller defendant irredeemable at sentencing under

76 Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Miller v Alabama, Nos 10-9646, 10-9647, *22 (US filed Jan 17, 2012) (available on Westlaw
at 2012 WL 174239) (APA Brief) (emphasis added) (noting that “such predictions cannot
be made with any accuracy”).
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Graham’s reasoning, Part II argues that the doctrinal conflict between Graham and Miller can only be resolved one way: with both
a redeemability assessment at sentencing and one year after sentencing. That is, the doctrine calls for a constitutional right to a
parole hearing for all juvenile defendants.
II. THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF GRAHAM, MILLER, AND
MONTGOMERY: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PAROLE HEARING
FOR ALL JUVENILE DEFENDANTS
Graham and its companion cases established clear constitutional rules, but opened constitutional questions as well. As
Part I.E observes, although Miller indirectly established that
some sort of redeemability assessment must occur at sentencing,
this holding remains in significant tension with Graham’s conclusion that making such an assessment while the defendant is still
a juvenile is essentially impossible because this assessment cannot be made with any accuracy at sentencing.77 If it is impossible
for an expert psychologist to definitively deem a juvenile defendant irredeemable at sentencing, surely a sentencing court is, at
best, hazarding a guess about a juvenile defendant’s capability for
reform ex ante. If that best guess was constitutionally insufficient
in Graham, why did it suddenly become permissible in Miller?
Furthermore, the Court failed to explain whether LWOP incorporates de facto LWOP, nor did it define “meaningful opportunity to
obtain release” in practice. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts was
right in concluding the Court’s Graham line of cases has no end
in sight.
Though the constitutionality of de facto and discretionary
LWOP are hotly contested questions at the state-court level, this
Comment contends that the analysis underpinning Graham and
Miller requires eliminating both sentencing practices for all juvenile defendants. In effect, this Comment calls for a constitutional
right to a parole hearing for all juvenile defendants. Part II.A first
addresses why de facto LWOP is unconstitutional, analyzing how
the sentencing practice thwarts the Court’s mandates. Part II.B
moves to discretionary LWOP, arguing that even Miller defendants deemed irredeemable at sentencing deserve a review of their

77 Compare Miller, 567 US at 479 (holding a state must consider the mitigating
qualities of youth before imposing LWOP), with Graham, 560 US at 73 (showing that even
expert psychologists cannot, with any certainty, assess a juvenile’s capability for rehabilitation at sentencing).
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sentencing at a parole hearing. With both of these conclusions in
mind, Part II.C expresses the implications of Graham’s mandate
that all redeemable juveniles be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”
A. De Facto LWOP Is Unconstitutional Because It Frustrates
the Graham Mandate
Although Graham, Miller, and Montgomery focus on express
sentences of LWOP, those cases raise questions about the constitutionality of de facto LWOP, which characterizes a sizable number of sentences of those juveniles who will spend the rest of their
days in prison. There are 2,089 individuals serving de facto
LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juveniles, accounting
for 18 percent of the total juvenile lifer78 population.79
The Court may have failed to explicitly address whether de
facto LWOP is unconstitutional, but states have spoken—and
they are split. States that have concluded that Graham and
Miller extend to de facto LWOP tend to view the Court’s analysis
holistically.80 For instance, the California Supreme Court relied
heavily on Graham’s discussion of “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” in holding de facto LWOP violates the Eighth
Amendment for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.81 In
contrast, states that have not extended Graham and Miller’s
holdings have made formalistic distinctions between LWOP and
its de facto counterpart. Reading Miller and Graham narrowly
when upholding the constitutionality of a three-hundred-year
consecutive sentence, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that
Miller does “not address the constitutional validity of consecutive
sentences, let alone the cumulative effect of such sentences.”82

78 The term “juvenile lifers” refers to those juveniles serving life sentences (LWP, de
facto LWOP, and actual LWOP).
79 See Nellis, Still Life at *16–17 (cited in note 11). This calculation is based on the
Sentencing Project’s figures for de facto LWOP (2,089) and the total juvenile lifer population (11,745). As mentioned in note 11, a de facto LWOP sentence is one that spans longer
than fifty years in prison.
80 For a comprehensive list of states that have answered this question, see
Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 195–97 (cited in note 75).
81 See People v Caballero, 282 P3d 291, 295–96 (Cal 2012) (concluding Graham entitles nonhomicide juvenile defendants an opportunity for a parole hearing). See also State
v Ragland, 836 NW2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013); State v Null, 836 NW2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013);
Carter v State, 192 A3d 695, 734 (Md 2018). In each of these cases, the defendant’s sentence exceeded his individual life expectancy.
82 State v Nathan, 522 SW3d 881, 891 (Mo 2017).
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Ultimately, courts that have ruled de facto LWOP unconstitutional have the better argument because they focus not on the
explicit holdings of the Court’s Graham line of cases, but rather
on the analysis underpinning them. Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery do more than their respective holdings suggest; for
all intents and purposes, they make de facto LWOP unconstitutional for all redeemable juveniles. To hold otherwise would allow
courts to essentially impose LWOP because a juvenile defendant
facing de facto LWOP still technically has the possibility for parole—even though parole eligibility could come decades, even centuries, after her death in prison. In light of Graham’s protections,
such a holding would frustrate the core principle that all nonhomicide juvenile defendants must be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” and cannot receive LWOP. When Miller
is layered on to the analysis, the substantive and procedural protections afforded to defendants in the mandatory LWOP context
should similarly flow to a juvenile defendant sentenced to multiple counts of homicide. Miller concluded that because “none of
what [Graham] said about children . . . is crime-specific. . . .
Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence
imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to
nonhomicide offenses.”83 If the same procedural protections
Graham offers flow to Miller defendants, a redeemable juvenile
homicide defendant should not be treated any differently than a
juvenile homicide defendant: both deserve a “chance for fulfillment outside prison walls.”84 It stands to reason that, at least for
the vast majority of juvenile offenders who are not deemed irredeemable, de facto LWOP unconstitutionally thwarts those juvenile defendants’ opportunities for release under both Graham and
Miller.85
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Miller, 567 US at 473.
Graham, 560 US at 79.
85 See Mark T. Freeman, Comment, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida
and the Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 McGeorge L Rev 961, 974–79 (2013) (arguing that based on the Graham categorical rule analysis, juvenile defendants categorically cannot receive de facto LWOP sentences).
84
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B. Discretionary LWOP Is Categorically Unconstitutional
Because It Effectuates the Imposition of LWOP on
Redeemable Miller Defendants
Although this Comment argues that the de facto LWOP question is resolvable under the Court’s precedent, discretionary
LWOP presents a difficult dilemma for Miller defendants. A key
precept of Miller was that courts could still sentence a juvenile to
LWOP if the juvenile was deemed irredeemable. However, the
fact that such sentences are only for those deemed irreparably
depraved strongly suggests the state has the affirmative burden
to show why LWOP is warranted.86 Currently, there are 2,310 individuals who were convicted as juveniles serving LWOP sentences, though a significant number are being considered for resentencing in the wake of Montgomery.87 Even if most of those
juveniles are deemed irredeemable—a notion that Miller and
Montgomery fundamentally reject88—the sentencing practice is
nonetheless extremely uncommon: the number of defendants convicted as juveniles serving LWOP represents only 1.1 percent of
the total life-sentenced population.89
States are split on this issue, but there is a significant trend
toward abrogating discretionary LWOP for redeemable homicide
offenders. Seventeen jurisdictions statutorily proscribe discretionary LWOP entirely for all juveniles.90 Additionally, some state
supreme courts have held that Miller and Montgomery’s protections extend to discretionary LWOP, though not all states agree.91
Courts that extend Miller to discretionary LWOP for redeemable
juveniles focus on the constitutional distinction between juveniles
and adults for Eighth Amendment purposes and the role sentencing courts must play in enforcing the burden imposed by Miller.
For instance, Washington (per State v Bassett92) and other states
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Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 175–77 (cited in note 75).
Nellis, Still Life at *17 (cited in note 11).
88 Both Miller and Montgomery held that the vast majority of juvenile homicide defendants are redeemable and deserve a meaningful opportunity for release. See Parts I.C
and I.D for further discussion.
89 See Nellis, Still Life at *16 (cited in note 11).
90 Id. See also State v Bassett, 428 P3d 343, 352 n 3 (Wash 2018) (collecting the statutes of the twenty-one jurisdictions that have abolished juvenile LWOP).
91 For a breakdown of the states’ respective answers to the constitutionality of discretionary LWOP for juvenile defendants, see Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 194
(cited in note 75).
92 428 P3d 343 (Wash 2018).
87
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have completely proscribed discretionary LWOP for all juveniles.93 Bassett conducted the same categorical bar analysis that
the Supreme Court performed in Graham, concluding that “states
are rapidly abandoning juvenile life without parole sentences,
children are less criminally culpable than adults, and the characteristics of youth do not support the penological goals of a life
without parole sentence.”94 The Iowa Supreme Court based its decision on the difficulty in making definitive determinations about
a defendant’s redeemability at sentencing.95 The underlying rationale of these courts is that Miller, at minimum, requires a robust determination of redeemability for a juvenile LWOP sentence, whether before or after sentencing.
The states that limit Miller’s holding solely to mandatory
LWOP cases focus instead on the Miller Court’s emphasis on
“mandatory” in the opinion. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, concluded that as long as LWOP is not the only possible
sentence for a juvenile defendant, Miller’s concerns were satisfied.96 The Virginia Supreme Court, though acknowledging that
sentencing courts must grapple with a juvenile defendant’s natural immaturity, nonetheless held that “there could be no Eighth
Amendment violation” if a court made the determination that
LWOP was still appropriate.97 The distinction these courts make
is thus primarily formalistic: had the Miller Court wanted to overrule discretionary LWOP entirely, it would have done so
explicitly.98
The latter courts’ formalistic distinctions ultimately prove
unavailing. Considering the strong language of Montgomery, sentencing courts cannot realistically sentence a juvenile to LWOP
without also assessing the defendant’s redeemability ex post.99
Because a juvenile defendant’s relative redeemability cannot be

93 See Bassett, 428 P3d at 360; State v Sweet, 879 NW2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016);
Diatchenko v District Attorney for Suffolk District, 1 NE3d 270, 286 (Mass 2013).
94 Bassett, 428 P3d at 354.
95 See Sweet, 879 NW2d at 839.
96 See Conley v State, 972 NE2d 864, 879 (Ind 2012). See also Nathan, 522 SW3d at
891–93.
97 Jones v Commonwealth, 795 SE2d 705, 721–22 (Va 2017).
98 See, for example, id at 721 (“[T]he very concept of binding precedent presupposes
that courts are bound by holdings, not language. This limiting principle [of only enforcing
the Supreme Court’s explicit holdings] exists because words in judicial opinions are to be
read in the light of the facts of the case under discussion.”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
99 See Part I.D.
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conclusively determined while she is still a juvenile,100 a sentencing court is at best making an educated guess about the defendant’s relative redeemability. This solution is constitutionally insufficient because imposing LWOP on a redeemable juvenile
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment under Graham and
Miller. LWOP is a punishment reserved for only those defendants
that the sentencing court can conclusively deem irredeemable.
Thus, the Miller defendant, as an adult, must be afforded a parole
hearing to determine if that original conclusion as a juvenile was
accurate.
This conclusion can be drawn from three logical extensions of
Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. First, Montgomery compels courts to evaluate a juvenile defendant’s youth as mitigating
evidence in sentencing.101 If a judge were to brush aside evidence
that the convicted juvenile in front of her is redeemable, she
would both be conducting an end-run around Montgomery’s requirement of conducting a robust redeemability assessment and
ignoring Miller’s directive that LWOP only be imposed in the
rarest of cases.102
Second, sentencing a juvenile defendant to LWOP would require a court to make a definitive ex ante determination that a
juvenile is irredeemable, even though irredeemability “is inconsistent with youth.”103 As Hoesterey articulates, Tatum v
Arizona104 highlights this tension.105 There, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded a series of Arizona cases, in which judges
merely considered each defendant’s mitigating immaturity but
nonetheless imposed LWOP.106 Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion, explained that the principal fault of these courts
was their failure to determine whether the defendants before
them were the “rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes
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See Graham, 560 US at 73.
Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 733. “Miller requires . . . the sentencing judge take into
account ‘how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to [LWOP].’” Id, quoting Miller, 567 US at 480. See also Hoesterey, 45
Fordham Urban L J at 177 (cited in note 75) (“Montgomery outright requires courts to
consider age-related mitigating evidence prior to sentencing a juvenile to [LWOP].”) (emphasis in original).
102 Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 177–78 (cited in note 75).
103 Graham, 560 US at 72–73, quoting Workman v Commonwealth, 429 SW2d 374,
378 (Ky App 1968).
104 137 S Ct 11 (2016).
105 See Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 178 (cited in note 75).
106 See Tatum, 137 S Ct at 11–13.
101
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reflect permanent [depravity].”107 For Justice Sotomayor, under
Montgomery, “the Eighth Amendment requires more than mere
consideration of a juvenile offender’s age before the imposition of
a sentence of life without parole.”108 In dissent, Justice Samuel
Alito responded that “the Arizona courts will be as puzzled by this
directive as [he is]” because each Arizona court explicitly considered Miller during sentencing.109 Furthermore, Justice Alito noted
that the juvenile defendants in each of the cases “fall into [the]
category” of juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect irreparable
corruption because they committed, what he considered to be,
heinous crimes.110
Justice Alito is onto something: The mandate that Justice
Sotomayor clarifies in her concurrence in Tatum puts courts in a
double bind. Sentencing judges must make an affirmative determination of redeemability before imposing LWOP on a juvenile,
but Graham based its conclusion on the notion that making such
a determination at sentencing is impossible.111
The Miller factors alleviate this problem, but it is uncertain
what value sentencing judges must assign each factor.112 For instance, should a sentencing court weigh a juvenile defendant’s
relative immaturity more than the challenges she has faced in the
home? Additionally, it is unclear how a sentencing court can effectively determine if the juvenile defendant’s crimes reflect immaturity or irredeemability. In Tatum, Justice Alito posited that
the depravity of a juvenile offender’s crime could support an assessment of irredeemability. But Bassett offers a powerful counterexample. Bassett committed three heinous murders, and thus
might well have been deemed irredeemable under Justice Alito’s
view. And yet, in the intervening time, he has surely “redeemed”
himself. Bassett turned his life around—a result no one could
have been able to predict when he was convicted. Sentencing
courts are thus effectively required to make a determination that
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See id at 12 (Sotomayor concurring), quoting Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 734.
Tatum, 137 S Ct at 13 (Sotomayor concurring).
109 Id (Alito dissenting).
110 Id at 14. See also id (“For example, in Purcell v. Arizona . . . a 16-year-old gang
member fired a sawed-off shotgun into a group of teenagers, killing two of them, under the
belief that they had flashed a rival gang’s sign at him.”).
111 See Part I.B for further discussion. For an argument about why the possibility for
parole must be the default determination at sentencing, see Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban
L J at 175–77 (cited in note 75).
112 See Sweet, 879 NW2d at 838–39.
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the Supreme Court has pronounced is impossible.113 And the
preliminary results of the effectiveness of Miller hearings suggest
that Bassett’s case is not an isolated example. As Professor Perry
Moriearty notes:
In Michigan, for example, prosecutors continue to seek life
without parole in the vast majority of cases involving juveniles convicted of homicide. In Oakland County, prosecutor
Jessica Cooper has sought new life without parole sentences
for forty-four of the forty-nine juvenile lifers impacted by
Miller, and in Wayne County, the majority of juvenile lifers
have been resentenced to terms of twenty-five, forty, or sixty
years before eligibility for parole. Similarly, in Louisiana, a
recent review of twenty-three juvenile homicide cases sentenced since 2012 revealed that at least 65% of defendants
had received life without parole sentences. Thus, unless and
until the Court bans juvenile life without parole, these inmates and those in other jurisdictions that refuse to embrace
the spirit of the Court’s jurisprudence will never be given the
prospect of life outside the prison walls.114
Ultimately, the double bind in which sentencing courts find
themselves stems from the tension between Roper, Graham, and
Miller—a dilemma of the Court’s making. In Roper, the Court abrogated the death penalty for juveniles with the knowledge that
LWOP remained a potent sentencing alternative.115 When faced
with LWOP for nonhomicide offenses in Graham, the Court attempted to redraw the line crafted in Roper by establishing that
a cognizable difference in culpability exists between homicide and
nonhomicide juvenile defendants.116 When the Court finally arrived at Miller, it had effectively boxed itself in. The Court had to
balance its claim in Graham that proving redeemability was essentially impossible at sentencing with the notion that LWOP
still remained an option for some juvenile homicide defendants.
Miller thus arrived at a categorical and individualized solution:
it abolished LWOP for nearly all juvenile homicide defendants,
113 See Graham, 560 US at 68, quoting Roper, 543 US at 573 (noting that differentiating between redeemable and irredeemable juveniles is difficult even for expert
psychologists).
114 Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 SD L Rev 539, 558 (2017).
115 See Roper, 543 US at 572 (“[I]t is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction . . . for a young person.”).
116 See Graham, 560 US at 69 (arguing that defendants who do not murder are categorically less culpable and that nonhomicide crimes are not as morally depraved).
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but it provided sentencing courts with the option of LWOP for the
rare juvenile defendants deemed irredeemable.117 Tenuous at
best, this haphazard solution has opened the door for courts to
make incomplete determinations when deeming such defendants
irredeemable without the requisite and robust deliberations that
Miller requires. The Arizona sentencing court’s errors in Tatum
exemplify this problem, and their conclusions are at least somewhat more reasonable in light of the bind that they face.
The third logical extension of Miller and Montgomery is that
a determination about a juvenile’s redeemability must be made
both at sentencing and in front of a parole board, years after sentencing, because a definitive ex ante determination of irredeemability is categorically impossible.118 Miller commands courts to
conduct an individualized hearing to determine a juvenile homicide defendant’s relative redeemability prior to sentencing. But
because sifting through the juvenile mind is nearly impossible at
sentencing, a court is effectively making its best guess as to
whether the defendant is irredeemable. An LWOP sentence that
denies a “juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity” based on a guess of irredeemability simply cannot be
sustained, “lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”119 As the Iowa Supreme Court
aptly put it, only “after opportunities for maturation and rehabilitation have been provided, and after a record of success or failure
in the rehabilitative process is available” can a judicial body
effectively decide if the offender is irreparably corrupt.120
Miller defendants sentenced to LWOP at minimum deserve
the same ex post parole hearing Graham defendants receive, even
though the technical contours of that hearing will be different for
both sets of defendants. For the Graham defendant, a parole hearing will fulfill her constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. For the Miller defendant, however, that
hearing will serve as an opportunity to rebut the sentencing
court’s initial best guess as wrong—that through her time served,
she has proven she is in fact redeemed. Denying a juvenile defendant an opportunity to revisit that initial guess and thereby
117

Miller, 567 US at 479 (emphasizing that LWOP for juveniles should be extremely

rare).
118 For a thorough analysis on why this determination is indeed impossible ex ante,
see generally Mary Marshall, Note, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119
Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/67FR-V98T.
119 Graham, 560 US at 72, 73.
120 See Sweet, 879 NW2d at 839.
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sentencing a redeemable juvenile to die in prison would, under
the Eighth Amendment, be cruel and unusual.
C. The Meaning of “Meaningful Opportunity to Obtain
Release”
Having established that neither de facto nor discretionary
LWOP can survive under Graham and its progeny, this Comment
now turns to the question of when a juvenile defendant must be
released. That is, what is the maximum sentence that would satisfy the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” standard? And
what procedural safeguards are required? Despite the Court’s
conviction in its holding, neither Graham nor Miller explicitly defined the contours of a “meaningful opportunity.” To shed further
light on this issue, this Comment illustrates why Graham and
Miller entitle juvenile defendants to a parole hearing. But this
Part argues that their collective mandate requires more: a constitutional right to a timely parole hearing. Graham recognized that
“[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope,” and that redeemable juveniles should not
“be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment
and self-recognition of human worth.”121 Geriatric releases122 and
de facto LWOP sentences run afoul of these principles because
they prevent juveniles from realizing the hope that Graham
promises.
Reading Graham’s precise mandate—a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”—under its plain language might lead to
the conclusion that redeemable juveniles are entitled only to a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release, rather than an actual
release. But the rigidity of statutory interpretation is a poor fit
for the Supreme Court’s principled approach. Reading this mandate in the context of the rest of the Court’s language suggests
that if release is appropriate, then the actual release must be
meaningful.
Consider an example: If Bassett were to be released on his
seventieth birthday after serving fifty-four years in prison, he
would have been incarcerated for longer than most parole-eligible

121

Graham, 560 US at 79.
Geriatric releases are those close to or immediately preceding a defendant’s life
expectancy.
122
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adult homicide offenders.123 Moreover, that release would come
far past the date Bassett could realistically start a family and
deny him a meaningful “chance for reconciliation with society [or]
hope.”124 Depending on his actual life expectancy,125 Bassett might
even be released with only a few years to live, rendering his sentence essentially tantamount to de facto LWOP. Either result
would directly contradict Graham’s requirement that a redeemable juvenile defendant not “remain in prison for the rest of his
days.”126 Considering Bassett is already well on his way to
“achiev[ing] maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human
worth and potential,”127 any sentence in which he spends nearly
all of his life behind bars—explicit LWOP, de facto LWOP, or geriatric release—leaves him without the hope Graham promises.
This Comment thus supports a broader interpretation of
Graham for the same reasons it concludes de facto and discretionary LWOP are unconstitutional sentences for juvenile defendants. An overly literal reading of the Court’s opinion would render
the Court’s second underlying principle—juveniles and adults are
constitutionally different for sentencing purposes—a distinction
without a difference.128
Scholarship has also tended to construe a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” as entitling redeemable juveniles to a
realistic chance to be released within their respective life expectancies.129 As Professor Sarah French Russell notes, a geriatric release does not achieve Graham’s promise of hope because “[s]uch
a sentence means being incarcerated past the typical childbearing

123 See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Delaying a Second Chance: The Declining Prospects for
Parole on Life Sentences *10–11 (The Sentencing Project, Jan 31, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/R68X-4KSY.
124 Graham, 560 US at 79.
125 Incarceration will also likely decrease Bassett’s life expectancy. For a further discussion of this issue, see Part III.B. For a breakdown of life expectancy by race and gender, see
generally National Center for Health Statistics, Life Expectancy at Birth, by Sex, Race, and
Hispanic Origin: United States, 2006–2016 (2017), archived at http://perma.cc/WB46-MBSR.
126 Graham, 560 US at 70 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted), citing
Naovarath v State, 779 P2d 944, 945 (Nev 1989).
127 Graham, 560 US at 79.
128 See Part I.B for a further discussion of how the Graham Court separates juvenile
and adult defendants for sentencing purposes.
129 See, for example, Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders,
State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 Ind L J 373, 406–19 (2014); Alice
Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 75, 75–77
(2010); Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 179 (cited in note 75) (“[G]eriatric release . . .
cannot be considered a meaningful opportunity.”).
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age [and] past the timeframe in which one could start a meaningful career.”130 Moreover, Russell contends a necessary component
of this mandate is that a juvenile defendant’s opportunity for release be genuine. Courts must guarantee redeemable juvenile defendants not only parole eligibility, but also a parole hearing with
a real chance to be heard and a strong presumption of release.131
Indeed, if parole boards denied parole for 95 percent of juvenile
lifers, such an opportunity would be meaningless.
This Comment thus embraces Russell’s premise: because de
facto and discretionary LWOP for juveniles are unconstitutional,
Graham and Miller entitle all juvenile defendants to a parole
hearing with the presumption that the defendant receive a
timely, nongeriatric release. A guaranteed parole hearing for juvenile defendants with the presumption of release provides juveniles a much stronger “chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls.”132 A weaker formulation of the mandate would be inconsistent with the underlying goals of Graham and Miller. Bassett’s
tale of heartbreak and redemption illustrates that even those juvenile offenders who committed the most egregious crimes are redeemable. Bassett’s case also shows that, despite achieving redemption, juvenile offenders can still be capriciously denied a
parole hearing.
Pursuant to the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, denying that opportunity to a redeemable juvenile offender
would otherwise be unconstitutional. Thus, the only question left
unanswered is: When is the latest date that hearing must take
place?
III. THE INEVITABLE QUANDARY: WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CEILING TO A JUVENILE’S SENTENCE BEFORE SHE IS ENTITLED
TO A PAROLE HEARING?
Having addressed the questions of de facto LWOP, discretionary LWOP, and “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,”
Part II established that all juvenile defendants are constitutionally entitled to a timely parole hearing with the presumption of
release. Part III confronts this Comment’s principal question:

130 Russell, 89 Ind L J at 406–19 (cited in note 129) (arguing that parole eligibility is
insufficient because it does not guarantee an actual hearing with sufficient procedural
safeguards and a presumption of release).
131 See id at 412–28.
132 Graham, 560 US at 79.
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What is the maximum number of years that a redeemable juvenile defendant must serve before the government must provide
her a parole hearing? Because the antecedent questions this Comment has already addressed remain so contentious among states,
and for some states statutory maximums already prescribe the
number of years before parole eligibility, the “when” question has
not yet been extensively broached by courts. However, the Third
and Eleventh Circuits have staked out positions on the question
of how sentencing courts ought to determine what a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release actually means.
This Part evaluates both approaches. Part III.A first explains
the Third and Eleventh Circuit positions on the contours of
Graham’s mandate. Part III.B then concludes that only the categorical approach sufficiently protects redeemable juveniles from
the dangers of LWOP. Part IV ultimately offers an alternative approach based on the Court’s categorical analysis.
A. The Third and Eleventh Circuit Approaches
The Eleventh Circuit in Mathurin upheld a fifty-seven year
sentence for a Graham defendant.133 Though it recognized the
split among courts regarding the de facto LWOP question, for the
purposes of Mathurin’s arguments, the court assumed that de
facto LWOP was unconstitutional under Graham.134 The court
then considered Mathurin’s argument “that a term-of-years sentence that might not effectively constitute a life sentence for a
young white or Hispanic defendant could become a life sentence
for a young black defendant” because, pursuant to actuarial tables that consider race in estimating life expectancy, black men
tend to live shorter lives.135 Mathurin rejected a sentencing approach that accounted for race, instead holding that such an approach would disadvantage those ethnic groups with longer life
expectancies.136 Mathurin first found that apart from the constitutional problems implicated by determining a defendant’s sentence based partly on their race, such a policy would mean defendants from longer-living ethnic groups would thereby receive
longer sentences.137 Second, the court noted that because

133
134
135
136
137

Mathurin, 868 F3d at 935–36.
Id at 932.
Id.
Id at 932–35.
Mathurin, 868 F3d at 932.
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actuarial tables account for “social, economic, medical, and cultural factors,” this approach would fail to account for how incarceration itself would impact those factors.138
A pivotal factor for the Mathurin court was also that a defendant could reduce the length of her sentence by earning goodtime credit, affording her, in the court’s view, the type of meaningful opportunity to obtain release that Graham requires.139
Because the court believed that “it is totally within [a] [d]efendant’s own power to shorten the sentence imposed,” Mathurin held
that good-time credit created a sufficient possibility for the
defendant to meaningfully obtain release by allowing the defendant to reduce his time served.140
The Third Circuit in Grant crafted a different approach. The
Grant court reviewed the sentence of a juvenile defendant who
effectively faced sixty-five years in prison before parole, amounting to a release at age seventy-two, which he purported to be the
same age as his life expectancy.141 Embracing the principles of
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, Grant held de facto LWOP to
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.142 But Grant
did not end there. The court asserted that to effectuate the Supreme Court’s mandate—to provide for the “fulfillment” and
“hope” guaranteed to redeemable juvenile defendants under Graham and Miller—a sentencing judge cannot simply release a prisoner before death.143 Instead, juvenile offenders must be provided
an “opportunity to meaningfully reenter society upon their
release.”144
Grant determined that this requires lower courts to consider
at least two factors in sentencing. First, Grant held that courts
must consider individualized life expectancy, rather than actuarial tables, in order to avoid replicating baked-in racial and gender
disparities.145 Second, “lower courts must consider the age of
retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy

138 Id at 932–33 (noting that incarceration might actually increase the life expectancy
of those who hail from disadvantaged backgrounds). This Comment, however, finds this
contention dubious at best. See notes 159–161.
139 Mathurin, 868 F3d at 934–35.
140 Id at 935.
141 Grant, 887 F3d at 137.
142 Id at 142.
143 Id at 148.
144 Id.
145 Grant, 887 F3d at 149 (“[W]e hold that a sentencing judge must conduct an individualized evidentiary hearing to determine . . . life expectancy.”).
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and the § 3553(a) factors, when sentencing juvenile offenders.”146
The court derived this second factor by asking what it considered
the ultimate question presented by the problem of de facto LWOP
sentences: “[A]t what age is one still able to meaningfully reenter
society after release from prison?”147 Recognizing that such linedrawing is fraught, the court identified the age of retirement as a
“widely acknowledged . . . earned inflection point in one’s life,
marking the [ ] end of a career that contributed to society.”148
Grant thus held that the Court’s juvenile sentencing decisions
compel judges to consider the age of retirement in setting a redeemable juvenile defendant’s sentence.149 In the absence of any
“widely accepted studies [that would] support [ ] precise line
drawing,” the court instead elected to adopt a “rebuttable presumption that a [redeemable] juvenile offender should be afforded
an opportunity for release before the national age of
retirement.”150
In sum, Grant and Mathurin both support a sentencing approach that rejects the use of actuarial tables, but both have key
methodological differences. While Grant calls for sentencing
courts to conduct an individualized sentencing hearing and consider the age of retirement as a sentencing factor, Mathurin upheld an approach that uses a generic life expectancy calculation,
which excludes race, and factors in the potential for good-time
credit. But, as the next Section addresses, this Comment rejects
both approaches because they do not guarantee the hope that
Graham and Miller promise juvenile defendants.
B. Circumvention and the Categorical Analysis: Why
Mathurin’s and Grant’s Approaches Do Not Safeguard
Juvenile Defendants
Mathurin and Grant broke new ground in their analyses of
the Court’s precedents. They evaluate juvenile sentencing in a
world in which de facto LWOP is unconstitutional and actively
consider what a meaningful opportunity to obtain release means
in the context of lengthy sentences. But both courts ultimately
miss the mark.

146
147
148
149
150

Id at 151, citing 18 USC § 3553(a).
Grant, 887 F3d at 150.
Id.
Id at 150–52.
Id at 150, 152.
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In offering a one-size-fits-all life expectancy framework,
Mathurin provides for some individualization and judicial discretion while allowing for clearer benchmarks for judges and avoiding the constitutional problems plaguing race-based sentencing
schemes. In addition, because juvenile defendants can always
earn good-time credit, they are in theory granted several meaningful opportunities for release across their sentence.
However, Mathurin does not effectuate the principles of the
Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Failing to account for
race and socioeconomic factors in sentencing would imperil a defendant with a lower-than-average life expectancy, such as black
men.151 Just as those juvenile defendants with longer life expectancies should not be punished with longer sentences, juvenile
defendants with shorter life expectancies should not be forced to
live out their remaining years in prison.152 Furthermore, the
court’s reliance on good-time credit would not provide for an effective solution because it assumes that the defendant is the only
driver of her ability to receive that credit. A constitutional right
to a parole hearing for juvenile defendants with the presumption
of release corrects that deficit because it shifts the burden away
from the defendant to affirmatively prove she has rehabilitated.
As Bassett’s case highlights, even a juvenile defendant who completely turns her life around can still face institutional barriers
that prevent her from securing parole.153 Moreover, this approach
would not be a suitable nationwide solution because of varying
good-time credit policies across jurisdictions.154 For instance, in
California, a defendant can reduce up to 83 percent of her sentence through the state’s good-time credit policy.155 In contrast, in

151

See Mathurin, 868 F3d at 932.
This Comment agrees with Mathurin’s concern that sentencing factors with
baked-in racial biases are constitutionally suspect. But Mathurin’s approach is also not
race-neutral because it punishes defendants who are of races with lower life expectancies
by not guaranteeing them earlier parole hearings. That is why this Comment’s solution
strives to protect those with lower life expectancies without hurting those who live longer
on average through race-neutral means. See Part IV for further discussion.
153 Prisoners’ actual receipt of good-time credit is also subject to the whims of prison
administrators, a point with which Mathurin fails to grapple.
154 Alison Lawrence, Making Sense of Sentencing: State Systems and Policies *9 (National Conference of State Legislatures, June 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2UH79EY9 (“State laws vary considerably in the amount of credits that can be earned.”). See
also, for example, Earned and Good Time Policies: Comparing Maximum Reductions
Available (Prison Fellowship, Mar 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/KB34-JG5J.
155 See Earned and Good Time Policies at *1 (cited in note 154).
152
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Iowa an inmate can only reduce up to 16.5 percent of her sentence.156 States like Missouri, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania have
no good-time credit policies at all.157
Unlike Mathurin, Grant attempts to solve the shortcomings
of Graham and Miller by creating an individualized framework
for sentencing judges. Grant recognizes the constitutional, ethical, and practical concerns of both employing life expectancies
based on actuarial tables and establishing a precise cutoff point.
Moreover, this framework creates a presumption that juvenile defendants can leave prison with an opportunity to live life and contribute to society. It recognizes that a release close to the age of
death is not actually a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.
Sentencing judges must at least maneuver around this presumption to craft longer sentences for juvenile defendants.
But Grant too deviates from the Court’s juvenile sentencing
jurisprudence because it prescribes a case-by-case determination
of juvenile sentences, which will deny some juveniles the chance
to fully and meaningfully reenter and contribute to society. The
Supreme Court departed from its longstanding precedent of reserving the categorical analysis for death penalty cases in
Graham because of the fear that redeemable juveniles would
nonetheless be sentenced to LWOP. The Grant approach fails to
redress that fear. A sentencing judge could sentence an otherwise
redeemable juvenile past the age of sixty-five because the retirement age is merely a factor.158
Even if a sentencing judge adheres to Graham’s mandate, she
could nonetheless be sentencing a juvenile defendant to a geriatric release because of the impact incarceration has on life expectancy. For every year in prison, a prisoner on average loses two
years of her life expectancy.159 If the median life expectancy is
78.6,160 a bright line of age sixty-five would mean forty-eight years
in prison for a seventeen-year-old defendant. This suggests that
a seventeen-year-old would lose around twenty-four years of her
life—placing her life expectancy around the mid-to-late fifties.

156

See id.
See id.
158 See Hoesterey, 45 Fordham Urban L J at 186–87 (cited in note 75), citing Graham,
560 US at 77–79.
159 See Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose–Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality:
New York State, 1989–2003, 103 Am J Pub Health 523, 526 (2013).
160 Kenneth D. Kochanek, et al, Mortality in the United States, 2016 (National Center
for Health Statistics, Dec 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/E8KS-LUDJ.
157
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Even a more conservative estimate would likely fail to provide a
meaningful opportunity for release but rather a geriatric one.161
A meaningful solution must account for individual variances
in life expectancy while cabining sentencing discretion, ensuring
only those juveniles who are truly irredeemable remain in prison
for life. Furthermore, a solution must ensure that juvenile defendants receive the same opportunities for parole eligibility as their
similarly situated adult defendant counterparts. Because Grant
and Mathurin fail to afford all juvenile defendants those guarantees, they do not rise up to this Comment’s clarification of the
Graham mandate. Only a solution that creates a uniform sentencing practice across all jurisdictions can provide the requisite
bright-line rule.
IV. THE CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS: A “DISCERNIBLE END POINT”
TO THE PAROLE-ELIGIBILITY PROBLEM FOR JUVENILE
DEFENDANTS
Ultimately, the answer to the “when” question lies with the
Court’s decision in Roper and Graham: the Eighth Amendment
categorical analysis. As discussed in Part I.A, the Court’s shift
from the case-by-case approach to the categorical analysis for juveniles in Roper and Graham suggests the Court strongly prefers
crafting uniform rules for juvenile defendants as opposed to handling individual sentences on a case-by-case basis, whenever possible. The difficulty in separating redeemable and irredeemable
juveniles for courts underlies this presumption. The Court has restricted LWOP as a sentencing practice for juvenile defendants to
protect the redeemable from spending the rest of their lives
behind bars.
This Comment thus argues that the categorical analysis
should be applied to determine the maximum number of years a
juvenile defendant can receive before being entitled to a parole
hearing. As opposed to a case-by-case determination of an individual’s life expectancy, the categorical analysis would set a

161 See, for example, William Alex Pridemore, The Mortality Penalty of Incarceration:
Evidence from a Population-Based Case-Control Study of Working-Age Males, 55 J Health
& Soc Behav 215, 221 (2014) (noting that those incarcerated men were more than twice as
likely to die a premature death).
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benchmark that would apply to all juvenile defendants across all
states.162
As Part I.A explains, when deciding to create categorical
rules under the Eighth Amendment, the Court considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to estimate national consensus.163
The Court also considers its own interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, which includes (but is not limited to) controlling
precedents, social science research, and the text and history of the
Eighth Amendment.164 With respect to “objective indicia,”
Part IV.A looks to state legislative enactments and data estimating the average number of years before a defendant is paroled and
argues that the national consensus on the maximum number of
years before parole eligibility is twenty-six years. To fulfill the
second part of the categorical analysis, Part IV.B follows in
Graham’s footsteps: it looks to social science studies and analyzes
the penological justifications for establishing twenty-six years as
the categorical rule.
A. Objective Indicia: Estimating National Consensus
Estimating national consensus on a maximum number of
years before parole eligibility for juveniles is a difficult endeavor.
Not all states mandate that juveniles are entitled to a parole
hearing, meaning that judges can nonetheless impose discretionary or de facto LWOP. Moreover, when it comes to actual state
practice, not all states have produced sentencing and parole data
specifically for defendants who were incarcerated as juveniles.
Crafting a perfectly representative bright-line rule based
solely on existing juvenile sentencing data and state sentencing
practices may be impossible, but it does not follow that no constitutional line should be drawn at all. Graham indicated that national consensus can be estimated by both legislative enactments
and actual sentencing practices. Because a combination of legislative enactments and state sentencing patterns is the best measure in the absence of available data solely of the former or the
latter across states, this Part follows a combined approach: a
model that incorporates states with built-in statutory maximums
162 Of course, states could continue to maintain statutory maximums lower than the
national maximum. They simply could not maintain a statutory maximum above the constitutional maximum.
163 Roper, 543 US at 563.
164 See Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407, 421 (2008).
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for juvenile defendants and states that have sufficient data showing average length of sentences (ALOS) for all parole-eligible
defendants with murder convictions.
1. Methodology.
This Section first looks to the fifteen states that have statutory schemes that impose parole eligibility after a certain time
period because those statutory enactments represent the maximum number of years a juvenile defendant can be sentenced to
prison before becoming parole eligible in those states. Most of
these legislative enactments came as a direct response to the
Court’s Graham line of cases and represent what each state believes to be the upper bound of a proportional sentence for a
juvenile defendant.
Unfortunately, not all those states that still permit discretionary LWOP have produced sentencing and parole data for their
juvenile lifers. As a result, this Section looks to the average time
served for all parole-eligible defendants—both adult and juvenile
at the time of their offense—convicted of murder since 2000.165
Using the raw data collected by Nazgol Ghandnoosh in Delaying
a Second Chance, a weighted average for each state was calculated by ensuring that each year’s parole data was proportional
to the number of defendants released that year.166
In the absence of data showing the average parole-eligibility
date for defendants convicted of crimes as juveniles, data showing
ALOS for all defendants with murder convictions comfortably establishes the absolute maximum amount of time the state can
sentence juvenile defendants before granting them a parole hearing.167 This Comment establishes a constitutional ceiling in its
methodology by only incorporating additional data that would
skew the maximum higher than the true national average. After
all, juvenile defendants ought to be minimally entitled to the
rights of their similarly situated adult counterparts.
165 This Comment uses the year 2000 because of available data. See generally
Ghandnoosh, Delaying a Second Chance (cited in note 123).
166 For instance, if State X’s average for 2010 was 25 years served for 10 defendants,
and its average for 2011 was 26 years served for 20 defendants, State X’s weighted average
across both years would be 25.67.
167 Even juvenile defendants convicted of especially heinous homicides and preemptively sentenced to LWOP deserve an ex post redeemability assessment. Bassett provides
a prime example of how such juveniles can turn their lives around during incarceration.
See notes 1–5 and accompanying text. After all, a parole hearing does not guarantee release; it simply provides a meaningful opportunity for one.
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In calculating this average, each state’s data was treated
equally and not based on its proportional number of defendants.168
There are, naturally, methodological objections to this Comment’s
approach. For instance, it overrepresents states with smaller juvenile defendant populations by treating states like Montana and
California equally. Additionally, one might wonder why the state
with the highest parole average or statutory maximum should not
set the “maximum” for the country. But those methods are not
aligned with the Court’s approach. As discussed in Part I.A, the
goal of the objective indicia analysis is to estimate the trends and
practices across jurisdictions while still treating individual states
as discrete data points.169 A nationally weighted analysis would
not adhere to the Court’s methodology because it would
overrepresent states with larger juvenile defendant populations
like California. Conversely, an approach that picked the state
with the highest average or statutory maximum would overrepresent states with lower juvenile defendant populations like
Montana. Both California and Montana are thus sufficiently accounted for by treating all states equally in the analysis.
No methodology is perfect, particularly when existing data is
incomplete. Consequently, this Comment’s methodology, in using
indicia across jurisdictions, seeks to incorporate states’ practices
regardless of their populations while remaining faithful to the
Court’s categorical analysis framework. Given that juvenile defendants are serving life sentences across the country,170 this
analysis treats all states the same.
Moreover, this Comment’s proposed rule is represented by
the same type of data the Court has relied on in its categorical
analysis jurisprudence: legislative enactments and sentencing
practices. Relying solely on legislative enactments would render
the analysis incomplete because it would only account for the fifteen jurisdictions that have statutory maximums. An approach
that relies only on actual state practice—ALOS for all
parole-eligible convicted murderers—would not adjust for those
168 In cases involving a sentencing practice that is permitted but rarely used, such as
Graham, the Court does consider the total number of sentences nationwide. However, that
approach is impractical in measuring the constitutional maximum for juvenile defendants
because the analysis seeks to identify an average across jurisdictions as opposed to a
specific number of defendants.
169 For instance, in Atkins v Virginia, the Court, considering a categorical challenge
to the use of the death penalty against the mentally ill, treated each state equally for its
objective analysis of state practice. 536 US 304, 314–17 (2002).
170 See Nellis, Still Life at *16 (cited in note 11).
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legislatures that have created legislative maximums personalized
for juvenile defendants. By combining data that accounts for both
legislative enactments and state practice, this Comment’s methodological approach more accurately forecasts national consensus. Additionally, the inclusion of ALOS data for paroled adult
defendants with murder convictions, to the extent that it presents
error, only skews the nationwide maximum upwards. Though this
Comment’s proffered limit might extend the sentences of those
like Bassett by a year or two if sentencing courts chose not to depart downwards from the constitutional maximum, the alternative is simply no rule at all: the perpetuation of discretionary
LWOP sentences for otherwise redeemable juvenile defendants.
Because the goal of incorporating ALOS data is to more accurately reflect state practice, this Comment only includes states
that have sufficiently representative data. Specifically, this
analysis includes only thirty-one states. The states that were excluded (1) permit discretionary LWOP, (2) do not have a statutorily required parole-eligibility term, and (3) did not have ALOS
data for parole-eligible convicted murderers after 2000 or had
fewer than two offenders released off parole.171
Even though some states are excluded from this analysis, not
all states are required to establish a national consensus. “Given
the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular
than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent
crime,”172 the fact that fifteen states have instituted sentencing
maximums for juvenile defendants173 indicates a consensus toward the type of rule this Comment calls for below.174
171 For a fifty-state survey of juvenile sentencing practices, along with references to
specific state statutes, see Kallee Spooner and Michael S. Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile
Homicide Offenders: A 50-State Survey, 5 Va J Crim L 130, 145–55 (2017).
172 Atkins, 536 US at 315.
173 See the Appendix for a list of the states with statutory maximums for sentencing
juvenile defendants.
174 The Atkins Court, which established a categorical rule that prohibited the use of
the death penalty for the mentally ill, found the fact that “a significant number” of states
had adopted legislation repealing that same sentencing practice to be a significant factor
weighing in favor of establishing the rule. Atkins, 536 US at 315–16. This Comment uses
ALOS data and state statutory schemes to similarly illustrate what it believes to be the
national maximum in the parole-hearing context, drawing its line in a manner that only
makes the ceiling higher for states and their juvenile defendants. Moreover, even if ALOS
is increasing for adult defendants, juvenile defendants remain constitutionally distinct for
sentencing purposes and still deserve an ex post redeemability assessment. Considering
that available parole data is limited, and not all states have specifically responded to
Miller and Graham by creating statutory maximums themselves, this Comment makes
the best use of available information.
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2. Data, results, and the proposed bright-line rule.
This Comment uses Professors Kallee Spooner and Michael
S. Vaughn’s fifty-state survey175 to analyze states’ statutory
schemes for sentencing juvenile defendants.176 States have taken
varying approaches, but those that have explicitly created some
form of sentencing regime fall into four general categories.177
First, several states have clear-cut statutory maximums for
sentencing juvenile defendants.178 The second group of states have
sentencing schemes with different maximums based on the
nature of the juvenile defendant’s offense. These include
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. The third
category of states, which includes Delaware, the District of
Columbia, and Florida, offer juvenile defendants some form of
judicial review after their initial sentence. Because this form of
review effectively serves the same function as the type of ex post
redeemability assessment that this Comment calls for, these
states are included in the analysis as statutory maximum states.
The fourth category of states generally have statutory maximums
for juvenile defendants, but have very small, infrequently invoked
exceptions. These states are included because their statutory
exceptions for LWOP are so narrow such that they apply to an
extremely small category of juvenile defendants. These states
include New Jersey,179 New York,180 and Nevada.181
175

See generally Spooner and Vaughn, 5 Va J Crim L 130 (cited in note 171).
See the Appendix.
177 All of these states are denoted as “statutory maximum” states in the Appendix.
178 Oregon is an example of such a state.
179 The maximum sentence a juvenile defendant can receive is thirty years, except
when a victim is under eighteen and the victim was killed during the commission of a sex
crime. NJ Rev Stat § 2C:11-3 (1)(b). However, it does not appear that any juvenile defendant in New Jersey is serving an LWOP sentence under this limited exception. See Juvenile
Life without Parole Sentences in the United States *11 (Juvenile Sentencing Project, June
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/YMH9-D7U6.
180 New York follows an indeterminate sentencing system whereby the maximum sentence for juvenile homicide offenders is life imprisonment and the minimum is fifteen
years. But since parole remains an option for juveniles, they become parole eligible after
serving the minimum sentence. See NY Penal Law § 70.05. Although technically juvenile
defendants can receive LWOP for committing terrorism under NY Penal Law § 490.25, no
juvenile defendant has been charged for terrorism in New York. Juvenile Life without
Parole Sentences in the United States at *11 (cited in note 179). See also Spooner and
Vaughn, 5 Va J Crim L at 149 (cited in note 171).
181 The maximum punishment any juvenile defendant can receive in Nevada is LWP.
Nev Rev Stat § 176.025. The maximum sentence a Graham defendant can receive is fifteen
years before parole eligibility, and the maximum sentence a Miller defendant who has
killed one victim can receive is twenty years before parole eligibility. Nevada retains a
longer sentence option, up to LWP, for when Miller defendants have multiple victims.
176
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For states that either allow for discretionary LWOP or allow
for de facto LWOP by not specifying a statutory maximum, this
Comment turned to available ALOS data.182 Some of these states
are excluded from this analysis; 183 those states are denoted as
“N/A” in the Appendix.184
By averaging of this data set, encompassing states that have
either minimum required ages for parole eligibility or ALOS for
homicide offenders, rounded up, this Comment proposes that the
maximum sentence that a juvenile offender may serve before a
parole hearing is twenty-six years.185 For example, for a juvenile
sentenced to LWP when she turns seventeen, a sentencing court
would have to guarantee that she receives a parole hearing on or
before her forty-third birthday.186 This is relatively in line with a
recent study in California, which has the highest juvenile lifer
population in the country,187 that found that the average age juvenile lifers were released from prison was 40.7.188
***
Creating a constitutional ceiling using parole data and statutory maximums, this Comment’s proposed bright-line rule
would be novel within the Court’s Eighth Amendment and juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.189 But it would not be unprecedented under the Court’s jurisprudence writ large. The Court has
employed a similar rule-setting approach when it is impractical
to leave doctrinal ambiguity for case-by-case resolution.

Nev Rev Stat § 213.12135. See also Spooner and Vaughn, 5 Va J Crim L at 149 (cited in
note 171).
182 See the Appendix for a list of these states and their respective relevant state codes.
183 See note 171 and accompanying text.
184 To see states not included in the Appendix and their relevant statutory provisions,
see Spooner and Vaughn, 5 Va J Crim L at 145–55 (cited in note 171).
185 The exact figure, rounded to the nearest tenth, is 25.6. However, this Comment
uses twenty-six to create a clean categorical rule and equip sentencing courts and parole
boards with a more flexible upper bound.
186 States can continue having statutory maximums underneath the constitutional
ceiling this Comment calls for. However, this Comment’s proposed rule would render unconstitutional any state statute with a statutory maximum above twenty-six years.
187 Nellis, Still Life at *16 (cited in note 11).
188 Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller
and California’s New Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 245,
274 (2016).
189 That is, though the Court crafts bright-line prohibitions in the Eighth Amendment
context through the categorical analysis, like in Graham, it has not yet crafted a numerical
bright-line rule like the one this Comment proposes.
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For instance, the Court has also relied on crafting a numerical bright-line rule as a method of resolving the conflict between
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause190 and an interpretation of an immigration statute. In Zadvydas v Davis,191 the Court
confronted the question whether the Attorney General could indefinitely detain an undocumented immigrant who a court has
determined to be unlawfully in the United States.192 When a court
has ordered an undocumented immigrant to be removed, the law
requires the Attorney General to remove her within a period of
ninety days.193 If the Attorney General is unable to remove the
undocumented immigrant within ninety days, the statute allows
the Attorney General to, if certain conditions are met, detain her
“beyond the removal period,” but it does not specify how long that
removal period could last.194 The Court ultimately concluded that
indefinite detention under § 1231(a)(6) violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.195 But the Court then had to face the
question of how long an unlawful immigrant could be detained.
Believing it to be “practically necessary to recognize some presumptively reasonable period of detention,” and “for the sake of
uniform administration in the federal courts,” the Court crafted a
bright-line rule of six months.196 The Court found six months to be
appropriate simply because it had some evidence that “Congress
previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more
than six months.”197
In Edwards v Arizona198 and in Maryland v Shatzer,199 the
Court, like its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, grappled with a
Sixth Amendment problem of its own making. The Edwards
Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment200 to mandate that after
a suspect invokes her right to counsel, any subsequent waiver of

190 US Const Amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”).
191 533 US 678 (2001).
192 Id at 682.
193 8 USC § 1231(a)(1)(A).
194 8 USC § 1231(a)(6).
195 Zadvydas, 533 US at 689–90.
196 Id at 701 (emphasis added).
197 Id.
198 451 US 477 (1981).
199 559 US 98 (2010).
200 US Const Amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.”).
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that right under police interrogation is presumed involuntary.201
The Shatzer Court then faced the natural next question of when
that presumption of involuntariness would lapse.202 It concluded
that the presumption ends after fourteen days, upon which police
officers can resume interrogation of the suspect.203 Shatzer recognized that leaving the question unresolved would be impractical
for police officers seeking to eventually restart interrogation with
a suspect who invoked her right to counsel, particularly because
a case-by-case determination would create inconsistent standards
across jurisdictions.204
The Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence has created a
similar problem in the Eighth Amendment setting: the lack of a
bright-line rule has allowed sentencing courts to impose de facto
life sentences on nonhomicide juvenile defendants and LWOP on
redeemable homicide defendants. Like police officers handling
the involuntariness presumption in the Sixth Amendment context, and like federal courts managing unlawful detention cases
prior to Zadvydas, sentencing courts are left to parse the mandates of Graham and Miller without clear direction. As discussed
in Part III.A, Grant’s and Mathurin’s approaches to enforce
Graham’s mandate will result in outcomes in which defendants
receive parole hearings past their estimated life expectancies—or
are barred from parole eligibility altogether. A bright-line rule
avoids that problem and guides sentencing courts in making their
respective determinations. This Comment’s proposed rule of
twenty-six years is also congruent with Shatzer, when the Court
concluded that fourteen days was enough time for a suspect to
“consult with friends and counsel.”205 It grounds itself in the type
of objective evidence the Court routinely employs in the categorical analysis. Moreover, both Zadvydas and this Comment’s proposed bright-line rule provide peace of mind to those detained or
imprisoned while ensuring consistent administration across
courts.
Perhaps, however, the strongest rationale for employing a
bright-line rule is the same reason why the Court distinguished

201 Edwards, 451 US at 484–85. See also Shatzer, 559 US at 104–06 (noting that
Edwards established this presumption).
202 Shatzer, 559 US at 98.
203 Id at 110.
204 See id.
205 Id.
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between adults and juveniles for sentencing purposes in the first
place. As Justice Kennedy plainly put in Roper:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to
the objections always raised against categorical rules. The
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token,
some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some
adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed,
however, a line must be drawn.206
This Comment also has shown why a line must be drawn to
guarantee juvenile defendants a parole hearing. Based in objective evidence of state practice and legislative enactments, this
Section has illustrated why a constitutional ceiling of twenty-six
years is the proper line to draw. The next Section shows how the
categorical analysis’s second consideration, the Court’s own judgment and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, also provides
strong support for the proposed bright-line rule.
B. Social Science and Penological Justifications for a
Mandatory Parole Hearing after Twenty-Six Years Served
A constitutional right to a parole hearing after serving
twenty-six years fulfills the core tenets of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence: it enables an ex post parole hearing
when both Graham and Miller defendants can show they have
been redeemed. For those Miller defendants originally sentenced
to LWOP in particular, this hearing will ensure that the sentencing court’s original assessment was correct. Such a categorical
rule is more likely to ensure that only those irreparably depraved
serve LWOP and prevent an arguably unconstitutional geriatric
release, outweighing the potential strain that such a hearing
would have on the parole system.
To show why LWOP for redeemable juveniles runs afoul of
the Eighth Amendment, Graham relied significantly on social science and neurological research to solidify the constitutional distinction between juveniles and adults, the lack of penological justifications for imposing LWOP on redeemable juvenile offenders,
and the lack of more availing alternative options. Though this
Section does not independently justify a twenty-six-year benchmark, it does justify drawing a bright-line rule. Moreover, this
206

Roper, 543 US at 574 (emphasis added).
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Section employs Graham’s framework to show why all juvenile
defendants are constitutionally entitled to a parole hearing that
enables a timely, nongeriatric release.
1. Social science: juveniles require an ex post assessment.
Looking to social science research, Graham constitutionally
enshrined three conclusions about juveniles: (1) they possess a
“lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”;
(2) they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and (3) their
characters are “not as well formed.”207 The Court cited studies
showing that parts of the brain, specifically those involved in executive function and impulse control, are still developing throughout adolescence. For the Court, this meant that juveniles were
less likely to be irredeemable.208
Studies since Graham also highlight powerful physiological
differences between adults and juveniles. Teens “take bad risks
and make bad bets. They engage in actions for the wrong reasons,
and to impress the wrong people. And . . . they frequently fail to
bring to bear relevant . . . information that they already know.”209
Because their brains cannot always logically connect the relevant
facts to a particular situation when making a decision in the moment, juveniles are less likely “to assess . . . a good versus a bad
risk, to inhibit impulses, and to silence the inner roar of concerns
about what their peers think of them.”210 Juveniles may know that
a course of action is wrong but may not be able to control their
impulsive and aggressive inclinations.211
Juvenile lifers’ developmental environments further complicate this narrative. A significant number experienced extremely
difficult upbringings: 79 percent witnessed violence in their
homes regularly, 32 percent grew up in public housing, and

207

Graham, 560 US at 68 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Roper, 543 US at 569–70.
Graham, 560 US at 68, quoting Roper, 543 US at 570 (“Juveniles are more capable
of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably
depraved character.’”).
209 Michael N. Tennison and Amanda C. Pustilnik, “And If Your Friends Jumped Off
a Bridge, Would You Do It Too?”: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal
Regimes Governing Adolescents, 12 Ind Health L Rev 533, 557 (2015) (citations omitted).
210 Id.
211 Id at 563.
208
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47 percent were physically abused.212 Furthermore, a considerable number had substantially diminished educational achievement. Fewer than half were attending school at the time of their
offense, and 40 percent had been enrolled in special education
classes.213
Particularly because of their difficult upbringings and lack of
physiological and psychological development, juvenile defendants
minimally deserve an ex post evaluation of their relative redeemability and culpability. A parole hearing, at most after twenty-six
years of incarceration, will allow parole boards to better separate
a juvenile lifer’s state of rehabilitation from her prior juvenile
mindset. A federal sentencing study found that inmates from ages
forty to forty-four had a rearrest rate of 46.5 percent, while
twenty-one to twenty-four-year-olds had a rearrest rate of 66.6
percent.214 Under this Comment’s framework, a fifteen-year-old
sentenced to the constitutional maximum would still receive a parole hearing by the age of forty-one. The bright-line rule this Comment offers thus maps well onto these recidivism statistics.
While social science and psychological studies helped the
Court separate juvenile defendants from their adult counterparts
for its constitutional analysis, Graham also offered several penological justifications when it crafted its categorical rule. Applying
those same principles, the following Section likewise concludes
that they support this Comment’s bright-line rule.
2. Penological justifications for a mandatory parole
hearing.
Graham held that “the purposes and effects of penal sanctions are [relevant] to the determination of Eighth Amendment
restrictions” because “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”215 Under any mainstream penological theory—utilitarianism, retributivism, incapacitation, rehabilitation—there simply
exists no justification or benefit from imprisoning an otherwise
redeemable juvenile until the end of her life or even a few years
before her estimated life expectancy.
212 Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life without Parole: An Overview *3 (The Sentencing Project, Oct 22, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4URH-AYWM.
213 Id.
214 The Effects of Aging on Recidivism among Federal Offenders *23 (United States
Sentencing Commission, Dec 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/AJ9L-JHLQ.
215 Graham, 560 US at 71.
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First, the utilitarian theory of deterrence does not justify geriatric release for the same reasons it does not justify juvenile
LWOP: juveniles are simply less amenable to deterrence. Because
they are more impetuous and impulsive in their decision making,
juveniles “are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions . . . [especially] when that punishment is rarely imposed.”216 Similarly, having a constitutionally
guaranteed parole hearing before juvenile defendants have
served twenty-six years of their respective sentences will not substantially diminish deterrence. Juvenile lifers are simply too far
removed from their actions to provide a general deterrence benefit to future juvenile defendants. Empirical studies that have
evaluated the effect of laws that treat juvenile defendants like
adults for sentencing purposes have found that such laws have no
measurable effect on deterring juvenile crime.217
Retributive rationales likewise do not justify geriatric release
under the Eighth Amendment. Graham found retribution to be
an insufficient justification to impose LWOP because “[t]he heart
of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender,” and juveniles are themselves less culpable for their actions because of their lack of brain and psychological development.218 This same precept extends to the analysis for the national
parole hearing requirement. Considering the mitigating factors of
age and the lack of significant behavioral control for juveniles, a
geriatric release is undoubtedly not proportional to the original
crime because a redeemable juvenile did not necessarily act willfully to commit that violent act. She is simply less culpable. Especially considering juvenile defendants serving LWOP will inherently spend a larger proportion of their lives behind bars than
their adult defendant counterparts, juvenile LWOP potentially
punishes adolescents even more than adults. While a forty-yearold homicide defendant sentenced to LWOP has at least experienced a substantial portion of her life outside of prison, a
fourteen-year-old facing LWOP—or even the prospect of release
216

Id at 72.
APA Brief at *34 (cited in note 76), citing Simon I. Singer and David McDowall,
Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law,
22 L & Society Rev 521, 526–32 (1988); Eric Jensen & Linda Metsger, A Test of the
Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 Crime & Delinq 96,
100–02 (1994).
218 Graham, 560 US at 71 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Tison v Arizona, 481
US 137, 149 (1987).
217
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ten years before her expected life expectancy—will be afforded no
such opportunity. Twenty-six years of incarceration is thus more
than enough time to absolve a redeemable and inherently less
culpable juvenile defendant.
Turning next to incapacitation, this penological principle requires that juvenile defendants have the opportunity for an early
parole. Graham noted that redeemable juveniles are less dangerous to society because their transient immaturity is an underlying cause of their offenses.219 Graham was incapacitated for some
time to prevent him from escalating his conduct, but the Graham
Court held that justification for incapacitation did not warrant
imprisoning him for the rest of his life.220 Miller and Montgomery
largely extended that analysis for juvenile homicide offenders because a vast majority are redeemable. That same logic extends to
geriatric release. There simply is no reason to incapacitate juveniles until their late sixties or seventies. As this Comment has
already noted, recidivism substantially declines as incarcerated
people age. The punitive effectiveness of incapacitation thus substantially decreases as a defendant ages into later adulthood.221
Minimally, juvenile offenders should not be incapacitated longer
than their adult defendant counterparts convicted of the same underlying offenses. Of course, incapacitation—like the other penological theories proffered so far—does not independently justify a
twenty-six-year bright-line rule specifically, or any specific numerical threshold for that matter. But it does support the principle of a threshold—and it supports that twenty-six years is more
than enough time to ensure society’s goals of incapacitating juvenile defendants until they have outgrown their tendencies for
criminal behavior.
Finally, rehabilitation fails to independently justify a geriatric release because the redeemable juvenile offender has likely already been rehabilitated earlier in her sentence. Just like LWOP
or de facto LWOP, a late-stage geriatric release “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal[ ] [b]y denying the defendant the
right to reenter the community.”222 This reasoning is even more
salient for juvenile defendants, a group of “offenders who are far
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Graham, 560 US at 72–73.
See id at 73.
221 See generally Alex R. Piquero, J. David Hawkins, and Lila Kazemian, Criminal
Career Patterns, in Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington, eds, From Juvenile Delinquency
to Adult Crime: Criminal Careers, Justice Policy, and Prevention 14 (Oxford 2012).
222 Graham, 560 US at 74.
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more likely than any others to reform as both their character and
their physical brain structure mature into adulthood.”223 That is,
juvenile defendants’ lack of substantive brain development actually turns in their favor: they have a much stronger probability of
and a longer period of time to achieve rehabilitation.
This Comment’s bright-line rule is grounded in this principle.
Determining redeemability much earlier will allow juveniles the
opportunity to show that they have been rehabilitated. The judicial safeguard of a timely parole hearing also incentivizes juvenile
defendants—with the knowledge of a parole hearing in their future—to take substantive steps toward rehabilitation. Without a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release, juvenile defendants
will never know for certain if the fruits of their labor will ever
materialize into an actual release.
Furthermore, failing to guarantee a constitutional right to a
timely parole hearing would also have a disproportionately negative effect on those with lower life expectancies. For example, the
average life expectancy for black men is 72.2.224 The makeup of
life-sentenced and de facto life-sentenced youth is 55.1 percent
black.225 A geriatric release of a black male into even his late sixties would therefore, on average, offer him little time to reintegrate. Considering that a prisoner loses two years of her life expectancy for every year incarcerated,226 this analysis does not
even account for the reduced life expectancy associated with
prison sentences generally.227 As Professor Christopher Wildeman
highlights, increases in mass incarceration are negatively associated with population health, and “increases in the incarceration
rate in the United States over the last 25 years may have done
even more to push the United States to the back of the pack in
terms of population health than the models including only a main
effect of incarceration imply.”228 Accounting for the effects of
prison on life expectancy, a nationwide requirement that parole
hearings for juvenile defendants occur by or before twenty-six
years of incarceration preserves the opportunity for release for
223

APA Brief at *34 (cited in note 76).
M. Jermane Bond and Allen A. Herman, Lagging Life Expectancy for Black Men:
A Public Health Imperative, 106 Am J Pub Health 1167 (2016).
225 Nellis, Still Life at *17 (cited in note 11).
226 Patterson, 103 Am J Pub Health at 526 (cited in note 159).
227 Grant’s and Mathurin’s solutions also neglect to account for the negative effect of
incarceration on life expectancy. See Part III.B for a further discussion on this point.
228 Christopher Wildeman, Incarceration and Population Health in Wealthy
Democracies, 54 Criminology 360, 376 (2016).
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all. Assuming they have taken steps to rehabilitate while incarcerated, all juvenile lifers should have the opportunity to reenter
and contribute to society.
3. Alternative methods prove unavailing.
Because a case-by-case approach insufficiently cabins judicial discretion in sentencing and states cannot accurately make
an ex ante determination that a juvenile is permanently depraved, a categorical rule is necessary. Graham rejected Florida’s
alternative approaches for mitigation, which required prosecutors to charge juveniles only for certain serious felonies and that
“prosecutors may not charge nonrecidivist [juvenile] offenders as
adults for misdemeanors.”229 The provisions did not absolve the
constitutional concerns at play because the courts could nonetheless make the subjective determination that a juvenile was “irretrievably depraved.” 230 Even if sentencing courts consider a juvenile’s relative redeemability during sentencing, this Comment
has already shown why it is effectively impossible to make an ex
ante determination that a juvenile is irredeemable. It follows that
only an ex post judgment at a parole hearing after sentencing and
time served can sufficiently address the Eighth Amendment concerns Graham presents. For Miller defendants, the ex ante determination only serves as the sentencing court’s best guess. Without an ex post assessment, some redeemable juveniles will be
forced to live out the rest of their days behind bars.
A twenty-six-year benchmark would avoid the pitfalls the
Grant and Mathurin courts highlighted while accounting for the
deficiencies in their solutions.231 Actuarial tables undoubtedly
have baked-in racial disparities, and sentencing individuals
based on their race presents significant constitutional quandaries.232 Establishing a constitutional right to a parole hearing after twenty-six years served mitigates those concerns by avoiding
the oversentencing of defendants who belong to races that live
longer on average and affords those with lower life expectancies
a genuine—and not a geriatric—opportunity for release. It also
cabins judicial discretion in sentencing by imposing a bright-line

229
230
231
232

Graham, 560 US at 75.
Id at 76, quoting Roper, 543 US at 572.
See Part III.B for a further discussion of the problems of Grant and Mathurin.
See note 145 and accompanying text.
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rule and guarantees an ex post redeemability assessment,
following the framework Graham created.
Though a constitutional right to a parole hearing will undoubtedly benefit juvenile lifers like Bassett, courts might be uncomfortable with the idea of recognizing a constitutional ceiling
at twenty-six years.233 Sadly, parole boards have also been increasingly less willing to grant parole across jurisdictions.234 This
can be attributed to an array of policy and legislative choices,
from delaying initial parole consideration to narrowing the rights
of incarcerated defendants during a parole hearing, along with
the lack of oversight and checks against parole boards’ determinations.235 It follows that a constitutional right to a parole hearing
might shift the constitutional issues surrounding juvenile sentencing downstream to parole boards themselves, even if juveniles have a presumption of release. That is, parole boards could
nonetheless deny redeemed juvenile defendants like Bassett
parole.
But this runs counter to even a plain reading of Graham’s
mandate. If all redeemable juvenile defendants deserve a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, it cannot follow that parole
boards can artificially deny parole ex post. The parole hearings
themselves must be meaningful opportunities for a juvenile defendant to prove her case for release. This Comment argues that
Graham’s mandate must mean that the presumption for all juvenile defendants at the parole hearing is release.236 If courts adopt
this Comment’s bright-line rule, parole boards will consequently
know that because only the rarest of juvenile offenders are
deemed irredeemable, the ones sitting before them are more than
likely able to reenter society. Denying a redeemed defendant like
Bassett the right to release would otherwise be unconstitutional.
But pivotally, without a constitutional right to a parole hearing, a juvenile defendant may never have the opportunity to plead
233 Admittedly, employing the Eighth Amendment categorical analysis to establish a
numerical bright-line rule is unconventional. See Part IV.A.2 for a further discussion on
this point.
234 Ghandnoosh, Delaying a Second Chance at *3 (cited in note 123). This might suggest that parole hearings are not that much better than the type of good-time credit policies discussed in Part III.B. However, a centralized system of parole hearings across states
is more transparent than varying good-time credit policies and is still within the scope of
the Court’s Graham line of cases and their constitutional rules. But even if parole hearings
suffer from similar problems, that problem only suggests that juvenile defendants might
be entitled to even more than just a parole hearing.
235 Id at *4.
236 See Part II.C.
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her case in front of a parole board. While the structures of parole
boards can be statutorily amended,237 the constitutional presumption that a juvenile is redeemable and is entitled to a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release can be effectuated only through a
categorical rule. Even though each decision did not resolve all of
the issues surrounding juvenile sentencing, Roper, Graham, and
Miller crafted categorical rules that rejected unconstitutionally
disproportionate sentencing practices against juveniles. A constitutional ceiling to a juvenile defendant’s life sentence naturally
follows the Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence: it both enshrines the presumption that juvenile defendants are inherently
redeemable and provides juvenile defendants what Graham
promised them—a “chance for fulfillment outside prison walls.”238
CONCLUSION
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery revolutionized the landscape and framework for evaluating juvenile sentencing, but they
nonetheless manufactured a constitutional dilemma. The Court
concluded that all redeemable juveniles are entitled to a meaningful opportunity for timely release and that sentencing courts
can only guess whether a Miller defendant is redeemable ex ante.
There then must be some point in time when the Eighth Amendment requires that an incarcerated juvenile have an opportunity
to show that she has redeemed herself.
The Eighth Amendment categorical analysis offers a resolution to this quandary. First, objective indicia, based on legislative
enactments and average time served for all parole-eligible defendants convicted of murder, suggest that a juvenile defendant is
constitutionally entitled to a parole hearing before having served
twenty-six years in prison. Though imperfect, this Comment’s
methodological approach crafts a bright-line rule using the best
data available while remaining faithful to the Court’s precedent.
Second, Graham and Miller’s core principles—social science
showcasing juveniles’ transient immaturity and impulsivity, the
lack of substantive penological justifications for imposing LWOP
on redeemable juveniles, and the lack of reasonable alternatives—also favor a constitutionally protected ex post
redeemability assessment. Without such a determination, a
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seemingly redeemable juvenile defendant will be left to languish
in prison either until death or close to it.
A categorical right to a parole hearing after twenty-six years
served would also solve the deficiencies of Grant and Mathurin.
It would simultaneously avoid the impermissible sentencing of a
juvenile defendant based on her race while still protecting those
with lower life expectancies. A constitutional ceiling to a juvenile
defendant’s sentence offers individualization through a parolehearing with the procedural and structural benefits of a categorical rule. A “discernible end point” to the process that began with
Roper and Graham, this Comment’s proposed rule is a clearer and
more robust framework for juvenile sentencing that avoids geriatric release.
After committing an extreme wrong as a juvenile, Brian
Bassett turned his life around. He became a model prisoner and
a model citizen. But the system that was seemingly built to recognize his rehabilitation failed him. It is only through a constitutional right for a parole hearing that the criminal justice system
can, at least with respect to sentencing juvenile defendants, begin
to redeem itself. Brian Bassett now has a meaningful opportunity
to obtain release. It is time to categorically extend that opportunity to all juvenile defendants.
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APPENDIX: STATUTORY SENTENCING MAXIMUM BEFORE PAROLE
ELIGIBILITY FOR JUVENILE DEFENDANTS AND AVERAGE LENGTH
OF SENTENCE FOR PAROLE-ELIGIBLE CONVICTED MURDERERS
State Years239

Data
Source

AL
AK
AZ

AR

30

Statutory
Maximum

CA

25

Statutory
Maximum

CO

40

Statutory
Maximum

239

Code and Explanation
N/A
N/A
N/A
With sentencing enhancements, the highest sentence a
juvenile defendant can receive
for any murder is thirty years
before parole. Ark Code Ann
§ 16-93-621.
Under Cal Penal Code § 3051,
(1) those convicted of offenses
committed at age twenty-five
or younger and sentenced to a
determinate sentence are eligible after fifteen years;
(2) those convicted of offenses
committed at age twenty-five
or younger and sentenced to
less than twenty-five years to
life are eligible after twenty
years; and (3) those convicted
of offenses committed at age
twenty-five or younger and
sentenced to twenty-five years
to life will be eligible after
twenty-five years. Individuals
sentenced to life without parole for offenses committed under age eighteen are eligible
after twenty-five years. Cal
Penal Code § 3051.
Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3
401(4)(b)(I).

ALOS data is rounded to the nearest tenth.
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State Years239

Data
Source

CT

30

Statutory
Maximum

DE

30

Statutory
Maximum

DC

20

Statutory
Maximum

FL

25

Statutory
Maximum

GA

25.9

ALOS
Data

HI

15.2

ALOS
Data

1491

Code and Explanation
For juvenile offenders currently serving sentences of
more than ten years, juveniles
are eligible for parole after
serving 60 percent of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater. Those serving
more than fifty years are eligible for parole after thirty
years. Conn Gen Stat § 54125a(f)(1).
Life sentences are possible
sentencing options for juvenile
defendants, but they have the
right to petition courts for sentence modification after serving the following terms: thirty
years for first-degree murder
convictions and twenty years
for all other convictions. Del
Code Ann § 4204A.
Juvenile defendants in DC are
entitled to judicial review of
their sentences after twenty
years. DC Code § 24-403.03.
Florida has no parole, but individuals sentenced as juveniles
have the opportunity to have
their sentences reviewed after
fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five
years served depending on the
crime. Fla Stat § 921.1402.
Ga Code Ann § 17-10-30.
The maximum punishment juvenile defendants can receive
in Hawaii is LWP, but the parole board has discretion to decide when defendants become
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State Years239

Data
Source

ID
IL
IN

28.6

ALOS
Data

MA

30

Statutory
Maximum

MI

31.9

ALOS
Data

24.1

ALOS
Data

IA

KS
KY
LA
ME
MD

MN
MS
MO
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Code and Explanation
parole eligible. See Hawaii Rev
Stat § 706-656.
N/A
N/A
N/A
Although Iowa Code
§ 902.1(2)(a)(1) allows Miller
defendants to receive LWOP,
the Iowa Supreme Court declared this provision unconstitutional. State v Sweet, 879
NW2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016).
However, the court held that
the remainder of sentencing
options under Iowa Code
§ 902.1(2)(a), including LWP,
is constitutional. State v
Zarate, 908 NW2d 831, 856
(Iowa 2018).
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Massachusetts has a threetiered system in which juvenile defendants are eligible for
parole after twenty to thirty
years in prison, depending
upon the nature of the offense.
Mass Ann Laws ch 119, § 24.
Michigan allows prosecutors to
petition for LWOP for Miller
defendants. Mich Comp Laws
Ann § 769.25.
N/A
N/A
LWOP remains an option for
Miller defendants in Missouri.
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State Years239

MT

25.3

NE

17.2

NV

20

Data
Source

ALOS
Data

ALOS
Data
Statutory
Maximum

NH
NJ

30

Statutory
Maximum

NM
NY

15

Statutory
Maximum

NC
ND

OH

22

ALOS
Data
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Code and Explanation
See Mo Rev Stat §§ 565.020,
565.033.
Montana implicitly allows for
discretionary LWOP. See Mont
Code Ann §§ 45-5-102, 46-18222, 46-23-201. See also
Steilman v Michael, 407 P3d
313, 318–19 (Mont 2017)
(“[S]entencing judges [must]
adequately consider the mitigating characteristics of youth
. . . when sentencing juvenile
offenders to [LWOP], irrespective of whether the life sentence was discretionary.”).
Neb Rev Stat §§ 28-303, 28105.02.
Nev Rev Stat § 176.025; Nev
Rev Stat § 213.12135.
N/A
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:11-3 (1)(b).
N/A
NY Penal Law § 70.05.
N/A
N/A
Ohio’s laws have not been revised to respond to Graham
and Miller. As a result, discretionary LWOP for Miller defendants remains an option
under the laws. See Ohio Rev
Code Ann §§ 2929.03, 2971.03.
See also State v Long, 8 NE3d
890, 896 (Ohio 2014) (“Ohio’s
sentencing scheme does not
fall afoul of Miller, because the
sentence of life without parole
is discretionary.”).
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State Years239

Data
Source

OK
OR

30

Statutory
Maximum

PA
RI

20.7

ALOS
Data

SC

24.7

ALOS
Data

TX

40

Statutory
Maximum

UT

25

ALOS
Data

25.3

ALOS
Data

SD
TN

VT
VA

WA
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Code and Explanation
N/A
Or Rev Stat §§ 161.620,
163.105(1)(a).
N/A
Courts have discretion to impose LWP/LWOP sentences.
See RI Gen Laws § 12-19.2-1.
Life without parole remains a
sentencing option for juvenile
defendants. SC Code Ann § 163-20. But see Aiken v Byars,
765 SE2d 572, 575 (SC 2014)
(noting that although a sentencing court could still technically sentence a Miller defendant to LWOP, Miller made it
clear that LWOP should still
be rare), citing Miller, 567 US
at 478–79.
N/A
N/A
Tex Penal Code Ann § 12.31;
Tex Govt Code Ann § 508.145.
The maximum sentence a juvenile defendant can receive is
LWP, but the statute does not
specify by what age a parole
hearing must happen. The
minimum sentence is twentyfive years. Utah Code Ann
§ 76-3-206.
N/A
N/A
The maximum sentence juvenile defendants can receive is
LWP, but no maximum is
specified under Washington
State law. See Wash Rev Code
§ 10.95.030; Bassett, 428 P3d

2019]

Categorically Redeeming Graham and Miller

State Years239

WI

25.3

WV

15

WY

25

Data
Source

ALOS
Data

1495

Code and Explanation
at 360 (ruling that LWOP is
an unconstitutional sentence
for juvenile defendants).
Wisconsin gives courts discretion to sentence juveniles to
LWOP. See Wis Stat
§ 973.014. See also State v
Barbeau, 883 NW2d 520, 531
(Wis 2016) (“[I]t is not unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to [LWOP] for intentional
homicide if the circumstances
warrant it.”).
W Va Code § 62-12-13c.

Statutory
Maximum
Statutory Wyo Stat § 6-10-301.
Maximum
Average
25.6

